rickyp wrote:Really? Here's what I've read about Scalia:
You know, I wanted to bring up Raich but my post was getting long and I needed to get back to work. However, I knew you would bring it up and let me knock it down. So thank you very much.
Check out
this column written by Randy Barnett who was lead counsel for Raich. In it he says some interesting thing. Such as
Justice Scalia clearly locates the “substantial affects” doctrine of Darby and Wickard, as well as the “essential to a broader regulation of interstate commerce” dicta in Lopez, in the Necessary and Proper Clause, not in the Commerce Clause — and in particular in the word “necessary” in that clause.(snip) if the substantial affects doctrine is viewed as resting on the Commerce Clause, then there is a temptation to add the Necessary & Proper Clause to it as an additional theory of power, and failing to realize that Lopez and Morrison were actually limiting the scope of the Necessary & Proper Clause, not the Commerce Clause. In short, there are judicially enforceable doctrinal limits to the scope of the Necessary & Proper Clause.
and
In Raich, we never denied the proposition that the “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” doctrine was grounded in the Necessary and Proper Clause, but argued instead throughout the litigation that whether a law was “essential” and therefore “necessary” had to be survive greater scrutiny than mere rational basis review. When Justice Scalia adopted a rational basis approach to ascertaining “necessity,” however, we lost his vote.
The Plaintiffs in the ACA case are not arguing for a heighten scrutiny of the necessity of the mandate to a larger regulatory scheme. They are actually making two arguments. First, the mandate is not necessary to Congress's ability to regulate interstate commerce. Second, that however necessary the mandate may be it is an improper means of executing Congress's Interstate Commerce powers. This was an argument never made in Raich. From what Barnett writes in the column, this is exactly what Scalia was looking for but absent from Raich so he couldn't rule on it.
The next important distinction Barnett makes is the difference between Raich and ACA. Specifically,
Raich was an “as applied” Commerce Clause challenge. In Raich, we conceded that Congress had the power to prohibit the interstate commerce in marijuana, but claimed that a subset of the national market in marijuana – namely wholly intrastate cultivation and possession that was authorized by the laws of some states – was outside of the power of Congress to reach. Yet no such challenge has ever succeeded. (Think Wickard, Heart of Atlanta, Perez, etc.) Recently, my colleague, Nick Rosenkranz has argued here that, on textualist grounds, no such challenge should ever succeed. When we litigated Raich the significance of this aspect of the case was not well understood, but I think it accounts for why Justice Scalia was moved to offer the Necessary & Proper Clause analysis he did.
In Raich, we were asking the court to carve out a subset of the class of activities Congress sought to regulate and find that this subset was beyond its power under the Commerce Clause. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia was wrestling with the following practical issue: Given the fungible nature of the commodity, what if “to carry into execution” its power to prohibit interstate marijuana, Congress decided it was “necessary” to regulate the subset of activities involving the identical commodity inside a state — regardless of whether it was being bought and sold and was therefore “noneconomic”? He concluded that Congress could draw the circle, that is define the class, as widely as it had a rational basis for believing it needed to be drawn to enable it to effectively enforce its regulation of interstate commerce that is within its powers.
The difference here is that the ACA is a facial challenge which means the law is unconstitutional as written. This is the big difference. In Raich, the defense admitted from the beginning that the law was constitutional as written and that only the application to subset of marijuana was wrong. This is how the ACA case different than Raich and similar to Lopez and Morrison. The plaintiffs are arguing that the ACA is unconstitutional as written because it is both not necessary and not proper, two arguments made in both Lopez and Morrison but not made in Raich.
Also notice the discussion starting in line 5 of the 2nd paragraph in the above quote. The part about giving Congress the ability to regulate subsets would give them the power to regulate noneconomic activity. Scalia voted in Raich to avoid giving Congress that ability. Isn’t that the exact argument being made in regards to the mandate? That the mandate is regulating noneconomic activity.
So a vote by Scalia to overturn ACA would still be clearly consistent with his underlying Judicial philosophy.