ray

Right, but the US did invade Iraq, so you are not building your case.

Israelis have the recent experience of the US to learn from....

Its amazing how often just waiting can create positive outcomes.)

Mr. Dayan’s assessment seems to buttress the theory that the collective saber rattling is part of a campaign to pressure the Obama administration and the international community, rather than an indication of the imminence of an Israeli strike. Many analysts here believe that hawkish statements by Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Barak this spring led to the harsher sanctions now in place, and that this is essentially Round 2.

“It could be only a tactical tool in order to push some of the other countries,” said Giora Eiland, another former national security adviser, who is a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. “They believe that in order to create enough pressure, to enhance the economic sanctions, the only way to do it is by creating the credibility behind the military option. The only way to create credibility is, No. 1, to improve the military readiness and, No. 2, to make a clear announcement that’s what we mean to do.”

When Israel struck at an Iraq reactor in 1981, the military assumption was “we would gain a delay of between one and two years on that program,” Oren said. “To this day, Iraq does not have a nuclear weapon.”

Oren, who described the Iranian nuclear threat as unprecedented in Israel's 64-year existence, warned, however, that "diplomacy hasn’t succeeded” thus far in halting Iran's atomic program, adding that “we’ve come to a very critical juncture where important decisions do have to be made.”

Conclusion The intensifying public debate in Israel is, first and foremost, a testimony to the fact that the country is nearing a decision on Iran, probably in the coming weeks. Despite being a tribute to a healthy democracy, the debate might also come with an unintended cost: convincing Tehran that it can safely discount the prospect of military action, whether Israeli or American. In reality, while the debate may complicate Netanyahu’s effort to win the required approval for such action within his divided cabinet, he may yet secure the necessary votes for a strike despite the controversy.

Whatever the case, public daylight between Israel and Washington on this critical issue is bad for both parties and is certainly unhelpful in their efforts to deter Iran. Although the window is closing, it is not too late to bridge the gaps. The parties must make an effort to do so while simultaneously lowering the public profile of their differences.

If Washington wants to influence Israeli decision making, it must reach out to its ally at the highest level both publicly and privately, presenting a clearer road map that seriously addresses Israel’s concerns in words as well as deeds. Now is the time for such dialogue – it cannot wait until after the US election.

I was listening to the radio about the current debate, and an Israeli pointed out that the 1981 secrecy was a total contrast to today's rhetoric. He suggested that this meant Netenyahu and Barak were blustering. I'm not so sure, but it does raise an important factor.

With the report that the country has already installed more than 2,100 centrifuges inside a virtually impenetrable underground laboratory, and that it has ramped up production of nuclear fuel, officials and experts here say the conclusions may force Israel to strike Iran or concede it is not prepared to act on its own. ...

Though Mr. Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are crucial to making the final call, attention has turned to a group of 14 ministers known as the inner cabinet, or security cabinet. Yossi Melman, an author of “Spies Against Armageddon,” a history of Israeli intelligence, said military actions typically required “a solid majority” of 12 or 13 members of this group, which is currently divided.

Three or four of the ministers are believed to be opposed to an independent Israeli strike, while six seem to be in favor. Two big unknowns are Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who both declined to be interviewed.

Mr. Netanyahu has been wooing Mr. Yaalon, including him in a small dinner when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was here in July. In a recent Twitter post, Mr. Yaalon warned, “History will judge whether the U.S. faced up to the Shiite threat in time to prevent Iran from acquiring a military nuclear capability.” But further posts indicated some wiggle room: “Anyone who wants to prevent the exercise of military power must see that additional biting sanctions are applied,” he wrote.

Mr. Lieberman, who frequently diverges from Mr. Netanyahu, said on television last week, “There is no situation in which Israel can accept a nuclear Iran.”

The divisions in the cabinet — and more broadly in Israel — are not along the usual left-right or hawk-dove lines. The disputes are mainly over how best to engage the United States.

The report indicates that by February 2013, at the latest, Iran will have nuclear-weapons "breakout" capability, meaning it will have all the skills and parts needed to quickly build an atomic bomb if Supreme Leader Khamenei gives the order to do so. Essentially, this is Israel's red line. ...

The IAEA's quarterly report is basically an admission that the efforts exerted by the UN and the West to set Iran's nuclear program back have failed completely. The report also determined that the military installation in Parchin was built in 2000, but the IAEA learned of its existence only in 2010.

The IAEA further revealed that Iran is enriching uranium not only with centrifuges but with laser technology as well. Iran, the report said, is also developing new, faster centrifuges for uranium enrichment that will allow it to produce fissionable material at a record pace. It is safe to assume that Iran wants to produce uranium and develop nuclear warheads before the US, Britain and France (and maybe Israel) get organized and launch a military operation against it.
...

The report also indicates that Iran accelerated the production of low-enriched uranium (a level of less than 5%) and uranium enriched to 20% purity during the months when the "stifling sanctions" went into effect and Tehran was negotiating with the western powers. ...

According to Barak, Israel will find it difficult to launch an effective military strike to delay Iran's nuclear program after the Islamic Republic implements its plan to install 3,000 advanced centrifuges at Fordo and after it transfers its enriched uranium to the site. Some 1,400 centrifuges have already been installed in Fordo, but most of them are not operational.

The IAEA report says Iran's facilities have produced 189.4 kilograms (417.6 pounds) of uranium enriched to 20%. In order to produce a bomb or a nuclear warhead Iran would need 260kg (about 570 pounds) of uranium refined to a fissile concentration of 20%. This means that Iran is on track to stockpile enough 20% enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by February 2013.

The report seemingly justifies an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. There is no doubt that if and when Iran installs an additional 3,000 centrifuges in Fordo and activates them, a solo Israeli strike would most likely not succeed in stopping or even delaying Iran's race towards a nuclear bomb.

Iran is not showing any signs that it is succumbing to the West's pressure, and the pace at which it is installing centrifuges (which at the current phase of the nuclear program is more crucial than the actual uranium enrichment) is impressive and poses a major threat. Therefore, if the decision-makers in Jerusalem have decided not to rely on the US and whoever is elected president in November, they must convene the Cabinet and order the IDF to act soon.

danivon wrote:I wonder what Lieberman's price would be. He has an agenda closer to home.