“I know what he needs. He needs something on refugees and on Jerusalem. I’ll give him enough land, maybe something like 94 percent with swaps. I have an idea about Jerusalem. There will be two capitals, one for us in West Jerusalem and one for the Palestinians in East Jerusalem. The mayor of the joint city council will be selected by population percentage. That means an Israeli mayor, so the deputy should be a Palestinian. We will continue to provide security for the Holy sites because we can assure access to them.” That’s probably a nonstarter, I thought. But concentrate, concentrate. This is unbelievable. He continued, “I’ll accept some Palestinians into Israel, maybe five thousand. I don’t want it to be called family reunification because they have too many cousins; we won’t be able to control it. I’ve been thinking about how to administer the Old City. There should be a committee of people—not officials but wise people—from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinians, the United States, and Israel. They will oversee the city but not in a political role.” Am I really hearing this? I wondered. Is the Israeli prime minister saying that he’ll divide Jerusalem and put an international body in charge of the Holy sites?
...
The Olmert proposal haunted the President and me. In September the prime minister had given Abbas a map outlining the territory of a Palestinian state. Israel would annex 6.3 percent of the West Bank. (Olmert gave Abbas cause to believe that he was willing to reduce that number to 5.8 percent.) All of the other elements were still on the table, including the division of Jerusalem. Olmert had insisted that Abbas sign then and there. When the Palestinian had demurred, wanting to consult his experts before signing, Olmert refused to give him the map. The Israeli leader told me that he and Abbas had agreed to convene their experts the next day. Apparently that meeting never took place.
...
The President took Abbas into the Oval Office alone and appealed to him to reconsider. The Palestinian stood firm, and the idea died.

Olmert had insisted that Abbas sign then and there. When the Palestinian had demurred, wanting to consult his experts before signing, Olmert refused to give him the map.

It's amazing. The Palestinian leader refuses an offered state and doesn't even make a counter offer, and all you can focus on is Israeli imperfection.

Ray Jay wrote:Because providing the map without an agreement ends his career.

It's amazing. The Palestinian leader refuses an offered state and doesn't even make a counter offer, and all you can focus on is Israeli imperfection.

...Concentrate. Write this down. No, don’t write it down. What if it leaks? It can’t leak; it’s just the two of us.

Olmert was on a roll. “I will need your help on security. The IDF has a list of demands—some of them probably are okay, but the Palestinians won’t accept all of them. I need the United States to work this out to the satisfaction of the military. Barak will work with you. I can sell this deal, but not if the IDF says it will undermine Israel’s security. That’s the one thing no prime minister can survive. And one other thing, I need to know that you won’t surprise me by offering other ideas before we’ve had a chance to talk about them. I’m taking an enormous risk here, and I can’t be blindsided by the United States.” Olmert had been leaning forward; neither of us had touched our dinner, and when the server had come in, he’d shooed her away. Now he sat back in his chair, exhausted by the recitation of the extraordinary details of the deal as he saw it.

“Prime Minister, this is remarkable, and I will try to help. I will talk to Abu Mazen tomorrow,” I promised. “Be careful where you speak to him because people may be listening,” he said.

After dinner, I hurried back to the hotel and related the details to David and Elliott only—minus the proposal on an international committee to oversee the Holy sites. I trusted my advisors, but a slip of the tongue on that one would have been devastating to Olmert. “You must not tell anyone,” I said sternly, knowing that they wouldn’t. Then I called Steve Hadley and told him that I had some extraordinary news but didn’t feel comfortable—even on a secure phone—repeating what I’d heard from Olmert. After all, I was in an Israeli hotel; one never knew who might be listening. “Tell the President he was right about Olmert. He wants a deal. And frankly, he might die trying to get one,” I said, recalling that Yitzhak Rabin had been killed for offering far less. I hung up the phone and looked out my window at the Holy City. Maybe, just maybe, we could get this done.

The next day I went to see Abbas and asked to see him in the little dining room adjacent to his office. I sketched out the details of Olmert’s proposal and told him how the prime minister wanted to proceed. Abbas started negotiating immediately. “I can’t tell four million Palestinians that only five thousand of them can go home,” he said.

I demurred, saying that he should make his concerns known to the prime minister. “Are you ready to talk with him alone?” I asked. Abbas said that he would but could not appoint a trusted agent—he wanted to do this himself. I sensed that the internal politics of the Fatah party were such that he could not sidestep Abu Alaa, a power in his own right and sometimes a rival within the party. This is going to be a problem, I realized. But just get them together, and see what happens—one step at a time.

I called the prime minister before I left and said that Abbas was ready to talk but wanted to do it himself. The prime minister said that he’d arrange a meeting. “What language will you use?” I asked.

“English,” Olmert replied.

“Remember that you speak it better than he does. He’ll be at a disadvantage,” I countered.

“It isn’t my intention to put him at a disadvantage,” he replied. I think he really means that, I thought. “I’ll be in touch, Prime Minister,” I said. “And I’ll tell the President about our discussions.”

Olmert ended by saying, “Remind him of our first meeting when I said that I wanted a deal.”

In the waning months of our time in Washington, we tried one last time to secure a two-state solution...

But I knew what had been proposed, and I asked Jonathan Schwartz, a State Department lawyer with many years of experience in the issue, to construct an approximation of the territorial compromise. I wanted to preserve the Olmert offer.

I talked to the President and asked whether he would be willing to receive Olmert and Abbas one last time. What if I could get the two of them to come and accept the parameters of the proposal? [b]We knew it was a long shot. Olmert had announced in the summer that he would step down as prime minister. Israel would hold elections in the first part of the next year. He was a lame duck[/b], and so was the President.

Still, I worried that there might never be another chance like this one. Tzipi Livni urged me (and, I believe, Abbas) not to enshrine the Olmert proposal. “He has no standing in Israel,” she said. That was probably true, but to have an Israeli prime minister on record offering those remarkable elements and a Palestinian president accepting them would have pushed the peace process to a new level. Abbas refused.

We had one last chance. The two leaders came separately in November and December to say good-bye...

Ray Jay wrote:Guys, Abbas didn't negotiate. Apparently he refused to have further discussions on the matter.

Most stateless people who are offered something resembling a state take it. That's what the Jews did in 1947. That's what the Kurds or Tibetans or any number of stateless people would do.

The real problem is that because of propoganda, the Palestinians think and act like they are negotiating from strength. But the reality is that they are negotiating from weakness.

Please elucidate on this point. Neither side looks particularly 'strong'. Sure Israel has military strength, but that isn't everything.

Read again what Rice wrote: "I sketched out the details of Olmert’s proposal and told him how the prime minister wanted to proceed. Abbas started negotiating immediately."

How do you know what the Tibetans would do? Or the Kurds?

And the offer would be subject to IDF demands, that Olmert knew some of would not get Palestinian approval?

And we have here some insight as to why Abbas may not simply be able to accept a deal without a lot of work and seeing it in detail - Abu Alaa was clearly a rival.

But in a normal negotiation one would expect that a partner in the negotiations would have the opportunity to carefully consider an offer and not be hustled into signing a scrap of paper....

Ray Jay wrote:It's amazing how differently we see this. Working my way up from the various posts:

Please elucidate on this point. Neither side looks particularly 'strong'. Sure Israel has military strength, but that isn't everything.

The Israelis have a state. They will indefinitely. They have a western lifestyle with all of the economic and personal benefits that come with it. They have security. The Palestinians do not have that. If facts on the ground do not change, the Israelis will continue to have a state, and the Palestinians will have a worsening situation, and probably continue to lose a little land in the process.

However, the Palestinians are often given false hope by their leaders, by the rest of the Arab world, and by the U.N. or other westerners. They think they can get what they want without making compromises because others tell them that. However, the reality is that the only way they can get what they want is to deal with Israel. That's just reality.

Dan:

Read again what Rice wrote: "I sketched out the details of Olmert’s proposal and told him how the prime minister wanted to proceed. Abbas started negotiating immediately."

Yes, he wanted to discuss the matter. Rice says negotiating, but it doesn't quite sound like that to me when he talks about 4 million refugees. In any case the point is that he doesn't seem willing to negotiate with the Israelis. They offered him something, but he didn't counter to them. The Israelis are the ones that matter.

Dan:

How do you know what the Tibetans would do? Or the Kurds?

The Kurds want their own state within Iraq, but have settled on limited autonomy for now. There are territorial disputes and financial disputes, But the Kurds have been smart enough to build institutions within their non-country and show themselves to be responsible and someone with whom the rest of Iraq can deal with.

The Tibetans have also shown pragmatic realism in the face of Chinese hegemony.

Of course any offer will be subject to IDF demands. The Israelis have a right to security. Why should they risk it? That would be insane.

Yes, Abbas did not have one trusted advisor that he could send to israel for a meeting. You are critical of different factions in Israel as invalidating the PM's offer, but seem to accept that the Palestinians have different factions to such an extent that their leader cannot trust anyone. This is very salient for the Israelis.