No strategic interest in a country next door to both Iran and China and not far from Russia and the former Soviet republics in central Asia?

No strategic interest in dealing with the Taliban, Al Qaeda and allies on their home turf?

We could quibble over how much of an interest there is, and the best way to address it, but I can't understand that there is 'none'. I'm also not sure why it suddenly becomes a major issue when the US and allies have been there for over 10 years.

You missed out the extremely close links between Afghanistan and (nuclear-armed) Pakistan.

There's a clear strategic interest there. In fact Afghanistan has been a vital strategic interest of the great powers since the Raj. This issue is whether the cost of securing our strategic goals in Afghanistan is one we're willing to pay.

Pakistan did cross my mind as I went through those others. I kind of took it as read, but thanks for making it explicit.

danivon wrote:No strategic interest in a country next door to both Iran and China and not far from Russia and the former Soviet republics in central Asia?

No.

If we leave, what changes? China, Iran and Russia will all suddenly be our enemies?

No strategic interest in dealing with the Taliban, Al Qaeda and allies on their home turf?

No. We're far better off sending missiles when needed. It's cheaper and it doesn't get our boys and girls blown up.

We could quibble over how much of an interest there is, and the best way to address it, but I can't understand that there is 'none'. I'm also not sure why it suddenly becomes a major issue when the US and allies have been there for over 10 years.

I was for leaving years ago. Nation-building in Afghanistan is about as fruitful a venture as planting vineyards on Mars.

Doctor Fate wrote:

danivon wrote:No strategic interest in a country next door to both Iran and China and not far from Russia and the former Soviet republics in central Asia?

No.

If we leave, what changes? China, Iran and Russia will all suddenly be our enemies?

So which of them would you prefer to increase their influence in the region and link up with your Islamicist enemies?

No strategic interest in dealing with the Taliban, Al Qaeda and allies on their home turf?

No. We're far better off sending missiles when needed. It's cheaper and it doesn't get our boys and girls blown up.

Missiles are not that cheap, and you would need some intelligence to accurately target them. On the other hand, allowing Al Qaida to operate away from home turf could bring the US more problems. Allowing the Taliban to establish themselves on the border with Pakistan won't make that country any safer or more stable.

Besides, if you are advocating 'sending missiles', that does suggest some strategic value to the place.

I was for leaving years ago. Nation-building in Afghanistan is about as fruitful a venture as planting vineyards on Mars.

Nice soundbite, but where is the substance? I don't recall much vocal opposition before the last change in the Presidency. There is a difference between 'nation building' and supporting a nascent state, and the latter is most definitely in our interests - preferable to a return to the position of the 90s - 2001 Afghanistan.

Your absolute refusal to accept any strategic interest in Afghanistan despite the well known facts, and despite the US having been there for 10 years for a specific reason boggles the mind. Then again, you are relying on Romney to have a policy of his own closer to your views, which it seems from statements the man has made so far is just not the case.

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN—After asking why the United States was in Afghanistan in the first place, 18-year-old U.S. Army Pvt. Josh McCombs received a frank description of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, from Master Sgt. Todd Brinkman, 33, between raids on Taliban insurgents Tuesday. “Turns out, the little shaver was only 7 back then, and his folks didn't want him to see the horrible pictures on TV,” the commanding officer later told reporters. “Then Pvt. McCombs asked: ‘If 9/11 happened more than 10 years ago, why are we here now?’ And that’s when I told him to stop asking questions and just follow orders.” McCombs was last seen explaining 9/11 to his fellow young infantrymen, who all reportedly asked the same follow-up question McCombs did.

All my children were born after 9/11, that's a weird thought.

Danivon: most of what you say is perfectly true but the question remains: what good can we accomplish (that's worth the cost) by remaining there another two years at present levels?

You write "Allowing the Taliban to establish themselves on the border with Pakistan won't make that country any safer or more stable." They are and have been established both inside and outside Pakistan. According to Wikipedia: "It is believed one of their current major headquarters is near Quetta in Pakistan." Are we going to significantly alter the level of their establishment over the next two years?

There can be no doubt that Pakistan's unrelenting support for the Afghan Taliban and allied militant organizations... has made any kind of victory -- however defined -- elusive if not unobtainable for the United States and its allies. The crux of the matter: The United States and Pakistan have fundamentally divergent strategic interests in Afghanistan. America's allies, such as India, are Pakistan's enemies, while Pakistan's allies, such as the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban, are America's enemies.

That's from an interesting article I read this AM.

Want to find a definite US strategic interest in Afghanistan? Just consider that Pakistan is a nuclear power - practically the definition of strategic - and that through our efforts in Afghanistan what we're really doing is trying to limit the power of radical Islamic elements in both countries.

The Taliban is no threat to Pakistan. The Taliban is a big threat to Pakistan. Both these statements are true because there's not just one "Pakistan". There's the "Islamic Republic" of Pakistan, a state built upon intolerance of infidels and which wouldn't be too displeased to turn the clock back a number of centuries, and then there's the modernistic and forward-looking Pakistan, with a diversified and growing economy, a love of cricket, and democratic leanings. Question: by remaining in Afghanistan do we influence Pakistan one way or the other in terms of which Pakistan becomes the predominant one? Do we draw the good Pakistan closer to us? Do we seriously wound the bad?

I am not convinced it's worth our gold and blood to maintain 90,000 US troops in Afghanistan for another two years. We have important interests there but are we furthering those interests enough to justify the cost?

I can get a room in a five-star hotel in Paris and spend one hundred dollars per meal for three squares a day, all for less than $300,000 per year. It costs a cool million a year to keep one soldier in Afghanistan.

Purple, you raise good points. Of course the current plan is not to maintain troop levels at 90,000 for two years. The level is currently lower than that, and this month we should see the completion of the drawdown to 68,000. There are various options for 2013, from maintaining that level all the way through, to a quick withdrawal down to 20,000, with a gradual process of drawdowns to 58,000 soon and 48,000 by the handover of control in July being a likely favourite. The plan is to have 10-20,000 there during 2014.

danivon

Of course the current plan is not to maintain troop levels at 90,000 for two years. The level is currently lower than that, and this month we should see the completion of the drawdown to 68,000. There are various options for 201e, from maintaining that level all the way through, to a quick withdrawal down to 20,000, with a gradual process of drawdowns to 58,000 soon and 48,000 by the handover of control in July being a likely favourite. The plan is to have 10-20,000 there during 2014.

The feasability of this plan is based upon the government in Kabul delivering governance that the populace will support. The evidence to date is that the current regime is corrupt, and its leaders extract money from the system to members of the family and tribes. Is whats left over providing enough value to villagers in the countryside, or to city dwellers in Kabul or Khandahar that they are going to take significant rick to support its maintenance?
I think thats pretty doubtful. The gradual draw down should keep the Taliban from committing to an all out campaign until it judges the forces remaining pose little threat. If thats sometime after 2014 it gives the current regime a couple of years to begin delivering enough to its citizens that they'll want to remain its citizens. Without their support, the Taliban will wear down the Afghan "professional army" in a couple of years....
Do you think that the regime succeeding as a positive force is really likely considering the regimes track record to date?

Ricky - the first part of the plan is already happening. The 2012 drawdown was ongoing by July, and is due to finish at the end of this month. Which suggests that the conditions are seen to be in place for that part at least

Indeed, the rest of the drawdowns for the 27 months ahead are not guaranteed, but my point was that it was not the intention to maintain levels of 90,000 beyond the middle of this year. Last I checked it had gone down to 84,000 for August.

danivon wrote:

Doctor Fate wrote:

danivon wrote:No strategic interest in a country next door to both Iran and China and not far from Russia and the former Soviet republics in central Asia?

No.

If we leave, what changes? China, Iran and Russia will all suddenly be our enemies?

So which of them would you prefer to increase their influence in the region and link up with your Islamicist enemies?

In what ways has staying their helped our relationship with Pakistan? We can't even get the doctor who tipped us off about Bin Laden released.

Has it chastened Iran?

Has being in Afghanistan convinced Russia, China, or both to cooperate with us in the UN Security Council?

Missiles are not that cheap, and you would need some intelligence to accurately target them. On the other hand, allowing Al Qaida to operate away from home turf could bring the US more problems. Allowing the Taliban to establish themselves on the border with Pakistan won't make that country any safer or more stable.

Missiles are a lot cheaper than dead Americans (or Britons).

The Taliban, in one form or another, is heavily involved in ISI. We're not "allowing" anything by leaving. We still have satellites, drones, and spies.

Besides, if you are advocating 'sending missiles', that does suggest some strategic value to the place.

Only blowing up training camps.

Nice soundbite, but where is the substance? I don't recall much vocal opposition before the last change in the Presidency.

Actually, I was for leaving under Bush. I started a forum about "Rules of Engagement." I forget what it was called, but it was obvious to me back then that the safety of our troops was not receiving the appropriate priority.

There is a difference between 'nation building' and supporting a nascent state, and the latter is most definitely in our interests - preferable to a return to the position of the 90s - 2001 Afghanistan.

It's a nascent nothing. We are trying to drag people into the 19th Century and they want no part of it.

Your absolute refusal to accept any strategic interest in Afghanistan despite the well known facts, and despite the US having been there for 10 years for a specific reason boggles the mind.

Really. What are the specific strategic interests for staying there? What specific gains can we hope to see? What gains has the President (or Bush before him) outlined that were not specifically related to terrorists (AQ or Taliban)?

Then again, you are relying on Romney to have a policy of his own closer to your views, which it seems from statements the man has made so far is just not the case.

That's not what I've said. I've said I hope that he looks at the cost/benefit aspect. That's what venture capitalists do.

Doctor Fate wrote:

Your absolute refusal to accept any strategic interest in Afghanistan despite the well known facts, and despite the US having been there for 10 years for a specific reason boggles the mind.

Really. What are the specific strategic interests for staying there? What specific gains can we hope to see? What gains has the President (or Bush before him) outlined that were not specifically related to terrorists (AQ or Taliban)?

Ahem. You were arguing that there is no strategic interest at all. Even Ricky and Purple (both of whom agree with you to some extent about withdrawal) can see that this is not the case.

Then again, you are relying on Romney to have a policy of his own closer to your views, which it seems from statements the man has made so far is just not the case.

That's not what I've said. I've said I hope that he looks at the cost/benefit aspect. That's what venture capitalists do.

However, they tend to look at the cost/benefit in purely financial terms, which is fine for capitalism, but tends to ignore the human aspects. Indeed, criticisms of Bain are about how sometimes it was more about maximising value to Bain than about creating jobs in the USA or keeping a business going.

Anyway, enough banging my head against brick walls, I'll respond to a different poster's more detailed comments.

Purple wrote:Danivon: most of what you say is perfectly true but the question remains: what good can we accomplish (that's worth the cost) by remaining there another two years at present levels?

As I've already said, that is not the plan. The plan is to draw down further this month (from c.84,000 in August to c.68,000 by the start of October), and to continue to reduce troop levels ending up with 20,000 or fewer in 2014.

So the question is moot, unless rephrased to say "what good can we accomplish (that's worth the cost) by taking two years to reduce troop levels?" or something similar.

You write "Allowing the Taliban to establish themselves on the border with Pakistan won't make that country any safer or more stable." They are and have been established both inside and outside Pakistan. According to Wikipedia: "It is believed one of their current major headquarters is near Quetta in Pakistan." Are we going to significantly alter the level of their establishment over the next two years?

Want to find a definite US strategic interest in Afghanistan? Just consider that Pakistan is a nuclear power - practically the definition of strategic - and that through our efforts in Afghanistan what we're really doing is trying to limit the power of radical Islamic elements in both countries.

Indeed. It's been mentioned in the past by both Presidents, and the thing about the Taliban is that they are not the terrorists who attacked the West. Al Qaeda are, and there are links between them, but the Taiban are far more interested in their own areas - Afghanistan and Pakistan.

One way of looking at is is this:

If the Taliban (and by that I mean the more hardcore elements of it) are not being tied down in southern Afghanistan, they have a choice that they can make -
a) consolidate in Afghanistan and try to impose rule over part or all of it
b) spend more effort in Pakistan

Neither of those is particularly palatable. Clearly the latter is a major worry, as a few years ago we saw Taliban/Taliban-like forces drive into central Pakistan and particularly towards the capital and a nuclear installation, as well as serious acts of terror there (particularly the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team). Since then, things are improved, and I think it's been in part a change within Pakistan, but also the ongoing pressures on them in Afghanistan.

The Taliban is no threat to Pakistan. The Taliban is a big threat to Pakistan. Both these statements are true because there's not just one "Pakistan". There's the "Islamic Republic" of Pakistan, a state built upon intolerance of infidels and which wouldn't be too displeased to turn the clock back a number of centuries, and then there's the modernistic and forward-looking Pakistan, with a diversified and growing economy, a love of cricket, and democratic leanings. Question: by remaining in Afghanistan do we influence Pakistan one way or the other in terms of which Pakistan becomes the predominant one? Do we draw the good Pakistan closer to us? Do we seriously wound the bad?

It is a tough question. If the only thing we do is remain in Afghanistan until the end of 2014, I'm not sure how much we can influence Pakistan itself. But I think that more than one thing can be done at the same time.

I can get a room in a five-star hotel in Paris and spend one hundred dollars per meal for three squares a day, all for less than $300,000 per year. It costs a cool million a year to keep one soldier in Afghanistan.

Hmm, well, they are not really comparable costs, and I'm sure you can see why. The per-soldier cost is actually arrived at by dividing the total costs of the commitment by the number of troops there, but that's quite crude - a lot of the costs will be for the hardware being used, transport, support costs that contribute to the overall NATO/allied effort, building costs etc etc.

It's also costly to keep troops trained and based in places like Germany or even on home soil.

To be honest, I think we all agree that we want our troops home, indeed to reduce the numbers of all foreign troops in Afghanistan. The question is really a case of 'how quickly'. No-one on here has argued for an open-ended commitment at current levels. Most advocate a pull out. The question is by when in in what way.

danivon wrote:To be honest, I think we all agree that we want our troops home, indeed to reduce the numbers of all foreign troops in Afghanistan. The question is really a case of 'how quickly'. No-one on here has argued for an open-ended commitment at current levels. Most advocate a pull out. The question is by when in in what way.

My bad for implying that the plan is to maintain a high troop level for all of the next two years rather than to gradually draw down. I wasn't thinking.

Now let's cut to the chase. So far the only potentially compelling reasons I've seen from Danivon (or anyone else) to justify our continuing expenditure of blood and treasure at high rates are these (all quotes are from earlier Danivon posts): we're there to assist the Karzai government and an election is coming up which will "probably give us a better view as to whether the current government (or the current governmental system) has popularity outside the areas of insurgency. A strong result would also give Afghans something to defend into 2014-15." There are "better scenarios" than a civil war after we leave (and presumably we can alter the chances of which scenario gets played out by staying the course). And finally: If the Taliban aren't "tied down in southern Afghanistan" they can "spend more effort in Pakistan".

Let's look at these one by one. Does having a foreign occupier who kills civilians and burns Korans supporting the government for another two years make it more or less popular? We certainly infuse more cash that can be used to buy votes, but do we really want to be in the business of funding unpopular and corrupt governments while making them more unpopular and corrupt? This doesn't seem like the road to any sort of success.

There might be better scenarios than a civil war after we leave? What - the Taliban will simply surrender en masse? Power-sharing? In any case, what are we doing by training Afghan National forces other than preparing one side for a civil war? There was civil war before we arrived and probably will be again no matter what we do. (Maybe for decades.) It's naive to think that we can bring peace to Afghanistan in the next two years, and if there's no peace when we leave, what would make for peace once we're gone? Hmm... maybe by leaving and letting them sort things out for themselves...

When the Taliban controlled most of Afghanistan and weren't "tied down" by US forces they weren't messing in Pakistan. The Taliban are an Afghan operation in everything except their need for temporary havens outside US patrol corridors. Do they cooperate with other salafist-jihadist organizations inside Pakistan? Sure. Also with the elements of the Pakistani government. But they are not themselves looking to take over Pakistan. The main issue in Pakistan's domestic efforts to keep salafist-jihadists at bay is not the degree to which US forces are tying down the Taliban.

Hey... to some extent I'm playing devil's advocate here. I'm providing the countervailing argument but I'm not insensitive to the points in favor of staying. Maybe we can do lots of good, not just on the margins. Maybe the forces we're training really are close to being ready and just need this bit of additional work. Maybe one more round of vetting will truly cleanse them of infiltrators. Maybe Afghans are beginning to catch on to the benefits of being a real nation instead of a land of warlords. Maybe. But the bottom line: I'm still not convinced that we're doing enough good in Afghanistan to justify staying beyond this winter. Got any more potentially compelling reasons to stick it out?

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ ... -extremism

I saved this issue of Foreign Affairs and unfortunately only a small bit of it is available without paying, but if you had a subscription like you ought, you could read it. stunning IMO.

This article shows, a full two years ahead of 9/11 that the Taliban, Bin Laden, and the region was well understood. We knew on day one of the attack that the Northern Alliance backed by Russia, Iran was the natural enemy of our enemy. Soon after we yet again insisted on our alignment with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the very powers that fueled and enabled al Qaeda.

We are to this day, led by the likes of Romney and Bibi leaning full tilt toward Iran and handing the world's best weapons systems to the Saudis. And no matter how duplicitous the Pakis, we continue to coddle them.

This book interview further highlights what was well known and how the administration just did what it wanted regardless.
http://www.democracynow.org/2012/9/12/5 ... nwalds_new