Please, TRY to understand English: Obama left him no option

In one of his final acts in office, President Bush in December of 2008 had signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Iraqi government that set the clock ticking on ending the war he’d launched in March of 2003. The SOFA provided a legal basis for the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq after the United Nations Security Council mandate for the occupation mission expired at the end of 2008. But it required that all U.S. forces be gone from Iraq by January 1, 2012, unless the Iraqi government was willing to negotiate a new agreement that would extend their mandate. And as Middle East historian Juan Cole has noted, “Bush had to sign what the [Iraqi] parliament gave him or face the prospect that U.S. troops would have to leave by 31 December, 2008, something that would have been interpreted as a defeat… Bush and his generals clearly expected, however, that over time Washington would be able to wriggle out of the treaty and would find a way to keep a division or so in Iraq past that deadline.”

rickyp wrote:fate

Please, TRY to understand English: Obama left him no option

I think you have the problem. (And you have a problem with debating like an adult...)
Since the agreement was signed by Bush, not Obama.... Obama was only following the agreement. An agreement which the Iraqis refused to renegotiate. Why would they, they had everything they wanted.

"From the beginning, the talks unfolded in a way where they largely driven by domestic political concerns, both in Washington and Baghdad. Both sides let politics drive the process, rather than security concerns," said Sullivan.

As recently as August, Maliki's office was discussing allowing 8,000 to 20,000 U.S. troops to remain until next year, Iraqi Ambassador Samir Sumaida'ie said in an interview with The Cable. He told us that there was widespread support in Iraq for such an extension, but the Obama administration was demanding that immunity for U.S. troops be endorsed by the Iraqi Council of Representatives, which was never really possible.

Administration sources and Hill staffers also tell The Cable that the demand that the troop immunity go through the Council of Representatives was a decision made by the State Department lawyers and there were other options available to the administration, such as putting the remaining troops on the embassy's diplomatic rolls, which would automatically give them immunity.

"An obvious fix for troop immunity is to put them all on the diplomatic list; that's done by notification to the Iraqi foreign ministry," said one former senior Hill staffer. "If State says that this requires a treaty or a specific agreement by the Iraqi parliament as opposed to a statement by the Iraqi foreign ministry, it has its head up its ass."

The main Iraqi opposition party Iraqiya, led by former U.S. ally and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, decided to tie that vote to two non-related issues. It said they would not vote for the troop extension unless Maliki agreed give them control of a high-level policy council and let them choose the minister of defense from their ranks. Maliki wasn't about to do either.

"It was clear from the beginning that Maliki wasn't going to make a move without the support of the other parties behind him," Sullivan explained, adding that the Obama administration focused on Maliki and neglected other actors, such as Allawi. "There was a misunderstanding of how negotiations were unfolding in Iraq. The negotiations got started in earnest far too late."

"The actions don't match the words here," said Sullivan. "It's in the administration's interest to make this look not like they failed to reach an agreement and that they fulfilled a campaign promise. But it was very clear that Panetta and [former Defense Secretary Robert] Gates wanted an agreement."

So what's the consequence of the failed negotiations? One consequence could be a security vacuum in Iraq that will be filled by Iran.

Perhaps you could invent an offer that Maliki might have accepted? Enlighten us as to what form that might have taken?

Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry (D-MA), in his own Friday statement, backed up the administration's argument that the lack of a troop extension was in the best interest of the United States and Iraq.

"The United States is fulfilling our agreement with an Iraqi government that wants to shape its own future," he said. "The President is also following through on his commitment to end both the conflict in Iraq and our military presence... These moves appropriately reflect the changes on the ground. American troops in Iraq will be coming home, having served with honor and enormous skill."

Ostensibly this pull-out was dictated by the unwillingness of Iraqi lawmakers to grant U.S. troops immunity from prosecution. But Iraqi leaders of all parties, save the Sadrists, also clearly signaled their desire to have a sizable American troop contingent post-2011. The issue of immunity could have been finessed if administration lawyers from the Departments of State and Defense had not insisted that Iraq’s parliament would have to vote to grant our troops protections from Iraqi laws. Surely some face-saving formula that would not have needed parliamentary approval could have been negotiated that would have assuaged Iraqi sovereignty concerns while making it unlikely in the extreme that any U.S. soldier would ever go before an Iraqi court for actions taken in the line of duty.

But for that to have happened, President Obama must have been committed to reaching a deal. He was not. Indeed the White House had already leaked word that no more than 3,000 to 5,000 U.S. troops would remain–well below the figure of 20,000 or so recommended by U.S. military commanders on the ground. This effectively undercut American negotiators and signaled to the Iraqis that we were not serious about making a long-term commitment to their future. Under those circumstances, why would Iraqi politicos stick their necks out on an issue like immunity, and run the risk that Obama would spurn them in any case?

"From the beginning, the talks unfolded in a way where they largely driven by domestic political concerns, both in Washington and Baghdad. Both sides let politics drive the process, rather than security concerns," said Sullivan

there were other options available to the administration, such as putting the remaining troops on the embassy's diplomatic rolls, which would automatically give them immunity

rickyp wrote:sullivan

"From the beginning, the talks unfolded in a way where they largely driven by domestic political concerns, both in Washington and Baghdad. Both sides let politics drive the process, rather than security concerns," said Sullivan

yes. So?
There's nothing that suggests that there was any liklihood of either Iraqis compliance to continued US troop presence if they were immune to Iraqis laws, , nor support in the US for continued US troops.
All you've done is repeat the situation which precluded any deal ever being agreed to ...
Sistani would not have allowed it and he was the real power in Iraq...

there were other options available to the administration, such as putting the remaining troops on the embassy's diplomatic rolls, which would automatically give them immunity

.
This is ridiculous. Embassey staffing levels have to be agreed to in diplomatic agreements that establish relations between countries...

You also missed the Administration's insistence that this get passed by the Iraqi legislature.

rickyp wrote:fate

You also missed the Administration's insistence that this get passed by the Iraqi legislature.

Are you saying that the US should have left an occupation force regardless of the wishes of the Iraqis government?

rickyp wrote:Answer the question:
Are you saying that the US should have left an occupation force regardless of the wishes of the Iraqis government?

danivon wrote:I think I'd like to see some more than just a throwaway on this...

Link? Quotes? Context?

And wasn't it the reality that Maliki didn't really want one? At least not on the terms that the USA demands.

Panetta writes that "the president's team at the White House pushed back" on requests to retain some U.S. troops in Iraq, and "and the differences occasionally became heated."

He adds: "Those on our side viewed the White House as so eager to rid itself of Iraq that it was willing to withdraw rather than lock in arrangements that would preserve our influence and interests."

Privately, the various leadership factions in Iraq all confided that they wanted some U.S. forces to remain as a bulwark against sectarian violence. But none was willing to take that position publicly, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki concluded that any Status of Forces Agreement, which would give legal protection to those forces, would have to be submitted to the Iraqi parliament for approval. That made reaching agreement very difficult given the internal politics of Iraq, but representatives of the Defense and State departments, with scrutiny from the White House, tried to reach a deal.

We had leverage. We could, for instance, have threatened to withdraw reconstruction aid to Iraq if al-Maliki would not support some sort of continued U.S. military presence. My fear, as I voiced to the President and others, was that if the country split apart or slid back into the violence that we’d seen in the years immediately following the U.S. invasion, it could become a new haven for terrorists to plot attacks against the U.S. Iraq’s stability was not only in Iraq’s interest but also in ours. I privately and publicly advocated for a residual force that could provide training and security for Iraq’s military.

Under Secretary of Defense Michèle Flournoy did her best to press that position, which reflected not just my views but also those of the military commanders in the region and the Joint Chiefs. But the President’s team at the White House pushed back, and the differences occasionally became heated. Flournoy argued our case, and those on our side viewed the White House as so eager to rid itself of Iraq that it was willing to withdraw rather than lock in arrangements that would preserve our influence and interests.

We debated with al-Maliki even as we debated among ourselves, with time running out. The clock wound down in December, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter continued to argue our case, extending the deadline for the Iraqis to act, hoping that we might pull out a last-minute agreement and recognizing that once our forces left, it would be essentially impossible for them to turn around and return. To my frustration, the White House coordinated the negotiations but never really led them. Officials there seemed content to endorse an agreement if State and Defense could reach one, but without the President’s active advocacy, al-Maliki was allowed to slip away. The deal never materialized. To this day, I believe that a small U.S. troop presence in Iraq could have effectively advised the Iraqi military on how to deal with al-Qaeda’s resurgence and the sectarian violence that has engulfed the country.

PANETTA: Well and I think we made a very strong case that we had to maintain at least 10,000 troops.

O'REILLY: And you looked him in the eye and you said, I, Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense -- and I'm assuming Mrs. Clinton did the same thing -- I, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, and I'm assuming the CIA did the same thing.

PANETTA: Exactly.

O'REILLY: All three of you looked Barack Obama in the eye like I'm looking you in the eye right now and said, "You have to keep forces there." And he said, "Well, I don't --

PANETTA: Well Bill, just to keep the record straight here, I think the President did support providing that $10,000 --

O'REILLY: Troops.

PANETTA: -- 10,000-troop presence in Iraq and supported CIA operations, supported the diplomatic operations that we wanted to continue. The real issue was how hard did he fight to make it happen?

O'REILLY: He didn't fight hard at all.

PANETTA: That's the issue that I raised.

O'REILLY: He didn't do anything. Maliki said, because Maliki is being threatened by the Iranians as you know, the Iranians didn't want the force in there, did they?

PANETTA: No.

O'REILLY: No.

PANETTA: The Iranians were trying to influence Maliki.

By not pushing the Iraqi government harder to allow a residual U.S. force to remain when troops withdrew in 2011, a deal he says could have been negotiated with more effort. That "created a vacuum in terms of the ability of that country to better protect itself, and it's out of that vacuum that ISIS began to breed." Islamic State also is known as ISIS and ISIL.

Panetta pointed out the 1,500 to 2,000 U.S. advisers in Iraq, for the ostensible mission of helping the Iraq army fight ISIS, are “boots on the ground”

So Stewart asked why 5,000 or 10,000 U.S. troops would do much better, after the Iraq war demonstrated the high costs of trying to impose a democratic form of government in a region beset by religious infighting for centuries.
Panetta seemed to agree, but went on to say the greatest threat to U.S. security is dysfunction in Congress. “We are operating by crisis,” he said

rickyp wrote:Fate I guess it depends on who interviews Panetta. O`Reilly, like you wants to fault Obama for everything.
And even then, Panetta comes off as a self serving schmuck who`s argument is that Obama didn`t try hard enough...
This is the same Panetta who opposed the use of torture till he took over the CIA.

On the Daily Show he was a lot more reticent to back up his claim that Obama could have tried harder. Wonder why. Maybe because he has nothing to back it up when seriously challenged.

There was this too....

Panetta pointed out the 1,500 to 2,000 U.S. advisers in Iraq, for the ostensible mission of helping the Iraq army fight ISIS, are “boots on the ground”

So Stewart asked why 5,000 or 10,000 U.S. troops would do much better, after the Iraq war demonstrated the high costs of trying to impose a democratic form of government in a region beset by religious infighting for centuries.
Panetta seemed to agree, but went on to say the greatest threat to U.S. security is dysfunction in Congress. “We are operating by crisis,” he said

Do you agree with Panetta that the greatest threat to US security is a dysfunctional Congress.