But no. I am talking about priorities, not binary choices. Sheesh.

That's nice of you to say, but I object to them as weapons, regardless of who has them

Netanyahu (and you?) seems to be against it on principle of being a deal.

What deal would you not accept?

No, the country withstood the sanctions and, unimpeded by any inspections, massively expanded its nuclear infrastructure. Iran went from 164 centrifuges to 19,000, accumulated more than 17,000 pounds of enriched uranium gas and ramped up construction of a heavy water reactor at Arak that could be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Harvard University’s Graham Allison, one of the United States’ foremost experts on nuclear issues, pointed out that “by insisting on maximalist demands and rejecting potential agreements, the first of which would have limited Iran to 164 centrifuges, we have seen Iran advance from 10 years away from producing a bomb to only months.”

Ray Jay wrote:Danivon:

Netanyahu (and you?) seems to be against it on principle of being a deal.

You say that even though he has laid out why he thinks this is a bad deal, and what a deal should include. I have written about that above so perhaps you missed it. BTW, my impression is that you and Ricky are in favor of it on principle of it being a deal. What deal would you not accept?

I see that Netanyahu has caught back up in the polls, although one of the hardline nationalist slates, that of Yachad and the Kahanist Otzma Yehudit, is wobbling at the 3.25% threshold.

Ten days to go before the election, and the opposition is trying to rally support: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/m ... -netanyahu

Acceptable sets limits on uranium refinement levels and opens up the program to constant inspection and verification. .

It would be unacceptable to have a deal that allows Iran to produce nuclear energy without inspections and verification.

Just before Labor Day weekend, the State and Treasury Departments sanctioned several individuals and organizations “providing support to illicit Iranian nuclear activities.” Due to the holiday, or perhaps because a few days later the Islamic State murdered an American journalist, the announcement attracted sparse attention. But, it should have been big news.

Some of the actions cited in the notice seem within what the Obama administration tolerates during ongoing negotiations, even if they violate U.N. Security Council Resolutions. These include illicit procurements for centrifuge enrichment and the heavy water reactor under construction at Arak. The administration recently detailed Iran’s ongoing illicit procurements in a report to a U.N. panel. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani boasted this summer, “Of course we bypass the sanctions, and we take pride in it.” Indeed, no one seems particularly concerned about ongoing violations of U.N. sanctions. After all, in July 2006, the Security Council demanded that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment-related activities, but eight years later, more than 9,000 centrifuges are still spinning at Natanz and Fordow.

One item in the August sanctions announcement, however, stood out as even more serious. It alleges work by “a Tehran-based entity that is primarily responsible for research in the field of nuclear weapons development.” The Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) answers to Brigadier General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. According to the State Department, General Fakhrizadeh led such “efforts in the late 1990s or early 2000s.” Noting that he was sanctioned by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007), the Department concludes that, “SPND took over some of the activities related to Iran’s undeclared nuclear program that had previously been carried out by Iran’s Physics Research Center [and other entities].”

True, certain restrictions would be imposed on Iran's nuclear program and Iran's adherence to those restrictions would be supervised by international inspectors. But here's the problem. You see, inspectors document violations; they don't stop them.

Inspectors knew when North Korea broke to the bomb, but that didn't stop anything. North Korea turned off the cameras, kicked out the inspectors. Within a few years, it got the bomb.

Now, we're warned that within five years North Korea could have an arsenal of 100 nuclear bombs.

Like North Korea, Iran, too, has defied international inspectors. It's done that on at least three separate occasions -- 2005, 2006, 2010. Like North Korea, Iran broke the locks, shut off the cameras.

Now, I know this is not gonna come a shock -- as a shock to any of you, but Iran not only defies inspectors, it also plays a pretty good game of hide-and-cheat with them.

The U.N.'s nuclear watchdog agency, the IAEA, said again yesterday that Iran still refuses to come clean about its military nuclear program. Iran was also caught -- caught twice, not once, twice -- operating secret nuclear facilities in Natanz and Qom, facilities that inspectors didn't even know existed.

Right now, Iran could be hiding nuclear facilities that we don't know about, the U.S. and Israel. As the former head of inspections for the IAEA said in 2013, he said, "If there's no undeclared installation today in Iran, it will be the first time in 20 years that it doesn't have one." Iran has proven time and again that it cannot be trusted. And that's why the first major concession is a source of great concern. It leaves Iran with a vast nuclear infrastructure and relies on inspectors to prevent a breakout. That concession creates a real danger that Iran could get to the bomb by violating the deal.

(better "Jaw Jaw than War War"),

Some of the actions cited in the notice seem within what the Obama administration tolerates during ongoing negotiations, even if they violate U.N. Security Council Resolutions.

Now, we're warned that within five years North Korea could have an arsenal of 100 nuclear bombs

You seem to be leaving out the third option, Ricky--military action to stop Iran's nuclear program.
A bad deal with Iran ties Israel's hands to a certain extent--Israel would be taking a risk of a breach with its relationship with the US if it hit Iran's nuclear facilities while the US had an agreement with Iran. With no deal, Israel would have a freer hand.

Israel already talked Bush out of a good deal back in 07

hacker'squote

Now, we're warned that within five years North Korea could have an arsenal of 100 nuclear bombs

What implications would an Israelis strike have on the ISIS situation?

source?

We have some history that can inform us on the more likely course. Between 2003 and 2005, under another practical president, Mohammad Khatami, Iran negotiated with three European Union powers a possible deal to place its nuclear program under constraints and inspections. The chief nuclear negotiator at the time was Hassan Rouhani, now Iran’s president.

Iran proposed to cap its centrifuges at very low levels, keep enrichment levels well below those that could be used for weapons and convert its existing enriched uranium into fuel rods (which could not be put to military use). Peter Jenkins, the British representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, told the Inter Press Service , “All of us were impressed by the proposal.” But the talks collapsed because the Bush administration, acting through the British government, vetoed it. It was certain, Jenkins explained, that if the West could “scare” the Iranians, “they would give in.”

Er......call me drunk, but I don't remember saying that

rickyp wrote:ray

source?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ ... ml?hpid=z2

We have some history that can inform us on the more likely course. Between 2003 and 2005, under another practical president, Mohammad Khatami, Iran negotiated with three European Union powers a possible deal to place its nuclear program under constraints and inspections. The chief nuclear negotiator at the time was Hassan Rouhani, now Iran’s president.

Iran proposed to cap its centrifuges at very low levels, keep enrichment levels well below those that could be used for weapons and convert its existing enriched uranium into fuel rods (which could not be put to military use). Peter Jenkins, the British representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, told the Inter Press Service , “All of us were impressed by the proposal.” But the talks collapsed because the Bush administration, acting through the British government, vetoed it. It was certain, Jenkins explained, that if the West could “scare” the Iranians, “they would give in.”