1. Do we know for certain that Assad's regime used chemical weapons?
The answer is No.
We are pretty sure that chemical weapons of some kind were used. We don't know what, exactly, and it's not 100% clear how they were delivered. Even if it were clearly military, the FSA may have capability, given that they do have some senior former Syrian Army members and they have controlled various parts of the country.
It looks highly suspicious that the UN inspectors were barred for so long, and then shot at, and certainly as part of a pattern it looks very much like the Assad regime, or the army, did it. However, the rebels would have a strong motive (as they have been gradually losing the war) to make it look like it was Assad in order to bring external assistance in.
Why would the government use chemical weapons when the inspectors were so close by - perhaps it was a rogue section of the army rather than the regime itself.
2. What would military action be for?
This is the key question for any kind of intervention. Too often it's about how we should do 'something' (but hey, let's not risk our boys' lives so just send in some missiles, right?), but before you think about what to do, you have to work out what the objective is.
Are we, as in Libya, going to effectively try and disable the Syrian war machine to allow the rebels to fight on more equal terms? Are we going to try and stop the war and keep peace? Are we going to try and remove Assad ourselves? Is it just limited to taking out likely WMD sites?
And sorry, RJ and DEFIANT, but when you start shooting missiles, it's war.
3. What are we prepared to do if our initial plan fails?
It's happened before.
The question of 'who should/will lead' is pretty secondary. As in Libya, it seems that the Europeans - primarily the UK and France - are pressing. I am guessing that Obama does not want to be seen to lead the way in, and established the 'red line' simply to explain why act on Libya but not in Syria, which was fine until someone did use chemical weapons.
I was not in favour of intervention in Libya when it started. In hindsight it worked out ok, but I still think it was risky and could lead to problems down the line. One of those was making more risky interventions more likely.
Of course, Libya is not Syria. Yeah, superficially they are both Middle Eastern countries, but Syria has a lot more people in a smaller area for a start, which means that even well aimed cruise missiles are more likely to take out a bunch of civilians.
The answer is No.
We are pretty sure that chemical weapons of some kind were used. We don't know what, exactly, and it's not 100% clear how they were delivered. Even if it were clearly military, the FSA may have capability, given that they do have some senior former Syrian Army members and they have controlled various parts of the country.
It looks highly suspicious that the UN inspectors were barred for so long, and then shot at, and certainly as part of a pattern it looks very much like the Assad regime, or the army, did it. However, the rebels would have a strong motive (as they have been gradually losing the war) to make it look like it was Assad in order to bring external assistance in.
Why would the government use chemical weapons when the inspectors were so close by - perhaps it was a rogue section of the army rather than the regime itself.
2. What would military action be for?
This is the key question for any kind of intervention. Too often it's about how we should do 'something' (but hey, let's not risk our boys' lives so just send in some missiles, right?), but before you think about what to do, you have to work out what the objective is.
Are we, as in Libya, going to effectively try and disable the Syrian war machine to allow the rebels to fight on more equal terms? Are we going to try and stop the war and keep peace? Are we going to try and remove Assad ourselves? Is it just limited to taking out likely WMD sites?
And sorry, RJ and DEFIANT, but when you start shooting missiles, it's war.
3. What are we prepared to do if our initial plan fails?
It's happened before.
The question of 'who should/will lead' is pretty secondary. As in Libya, it seems that the Europeans - primarily the UK and France - are pressing. I am guessing that Obama does not want to be seen to lead the way in, and established the 'red line' simply to explain why act on Libya but not in Syria, which was fine until someone did use chemical weapons.
I was not in favour of intervention in Libya when it started. In hindsight it worked out ok, but I still think it was risky and could lead to problems down the line. One of those was making more risky interventions more likely.
Of course, Libya is not Syria. Yeah, superficially they are both Middle Eastern countries, but Syria has a lot more people in a smaller area for a start, which means that even well aimed cruise missiles are more likely to take out a bunch of civilians.