In what way do you disagree? Do you not accept inflation as real?
Archduke Russell John wrote:rickyp wrote:And how does this jibe with all the serious republicans who've signed Grover Norquists Pledge?
236 of 242 House republicans have signed the pledge.
The pledge leaves them zero room for compromise if they indeed to honor their commitment.
Because bonehead, just because they signed the thing doesn't mean they are going to follow it. It's a expediency during election time to keep a nutcase off your back.
Archduke Russell John wrote:rickyp wrote:And how does this jibe with all the serious republicans who've signed Grover Norquists Pledge?
236 of 242 House republicans have signed the pledge.
The pledge leaves them zero room for compromise if they indeed to honor their commitment.
Because bonehead, just because they signed the thing doesn't mean they are going to follow it. It's a expediency during election time to keep a nutcase off your back.
Because bonehead, just because they signed the thing doesn't mean they are going to follow it. It's a expediency during election time to keep a nutcase off your back.
It is treated as any other campaign promise. It is something they support but understand that compromises need to be made. If a decent compromise on spending cuts can be made, most Republicans would agree to some tax changes.danivon wrote:So, let me get this right. You are saying that up to 90% of Republicans currently in national elected office have signed a pledge that they don't intend to keep?
Absolutely, Norquist has a national reputation and a national audience with the money to back it up. John Q. Public does not. This is why Obama made the comment about clinging to guns and religion in a roomful of people who paid to see him that he would never have made in front of a non-paying audience.danivon wrote:In an earlier post you said we could ask any Republican in or seeking office. Norquist already asked. Would we get a different answer depending on who asked it?
danivon wrote:And if you think that signing a pledge and then breaking it will get Grover and the Tea Party off their backs, I have to say I doubt it. Isn't that part of what fires up the Tea Party in the first place?
Boehner's problem wasn't the agreed upon revenue enhancements but rather the lack of serious spending cuts. The offered cuts were the usual combination of promise not to spend more this year then last year and will vote on other cuts over the next 10 years if you raise taxes now. That is not going to fly anymore because every time those deals are made, the spending increases the next year and the spending cuts are never voted on. If the deal Boehner had worked out included real cuts, he would have had the votes on the right even if it included tax increases.Ray Jay wrote:In the recent negotiation, Boehner was hemmed in by the no new taxes pledge. It has been reported that he and Obama were close to a deal (and we will never know who backed out first), but the reality is that Boehner could not live up to his part of the bargain because of his right flank. (Whether Obama was negotiating in good faith is a separate question.).
Archduke Russell John wrote:Boehner's problem wasn't the agreed upon revenue enhancements but rather the lack of serious spending cuts. The offered cuts were the usual combination of promise not to spend more this year then last year and will vote on other cuts over the next 10 years if you raise taxes now. That is not going to fly anymore because every time those deals are made, the spending increases the next year and the spending cuts are never voted on. If the deal Boehner had worked out included real cuts, he would have had the votes on the right even if it included tax increases.Ray Jay wrote:In the recent negotiation, Boehner was hemmed in by the no new taxes pledge. It has been reported that he and Obama were close to a deal (and we will never know who backed out first), but the reality is that Boehner could not live up to his part of the bargain because of his right flank. (Whether Obama was negotiating in good faith is a separate question.).
But in his counteroffer, Obama had reversed the formulation so that the tax revenue figure — now at $1.16 trillion — would be the minimum that rewriting the code could achieve (a floor), rather than a maximum (a ceiling). With a slight turn of phrase, he rejected Boehner’s entire premise that growth could be counted on to deliver some of the revenue. Boehner could seek all the macro estimates he wanted if it made him feel better, but he wouldn’t be able to use those estimates to lower the amount of new tax revenue that Congress would need to collect.
White House aides would later insist that, despite their rough agreement on a framework the previous Sunday, the discussion about tax reform had always been fluid and unsettled, an ongoing negotiation in which both sides were still feeling out each other’s limits. The Gang of Six briefing had no doubt complicated this negotiation, they agreed, but it wasn’t as if they had signed on to something and then taken it back. If this is true, though, then it’s true only in the technical sense. If you shake hands with a guy on the price of a car, and you agree to talk again after the car has been inspected and the loan has been approved, you don’t really expect to show up and find out that car now costs $5,000 more. This is essentially what happened to Boehner. What both Tuesday’s panicky calls from the White House and the subsequent counteroffer make clear is that Obama knew he was changing the terms and felt he had no choice.
Cantor’s objections weren’t simply obstructionist. He didn’t like the revenue piece — partly on principle, and partly because he thought it would reignite the grass-roots insurgency that Washington Republicans had been desperately trying to keep under control, endangering the re-election of some members. A fight over taxes — with the party’s leaders arguing that government should get more money, rather than less — might lead to outright insurrection and a breakaway third party. Cantor also didn’t trust the White House to stand by a deal, warning that they would ultimately come back with more demands. Perhaps most important, Cantor was highly skeptical that a grand bargain — with Boehner’s $800 billion gambit already being called a tax increase by The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page — had any chance of passing the House.
The Republican version of reality goes, briefly, like this: Boehner and Obama shook hands on a far-reaching deal to rewrite the tax code, roll back the cost of entitlements and slash deficits. But then Obama, reacting to pressure from Democrats in Congress, panicked at the last minute and suddenly demanded that Republicans accede to hundreds of billions of dollars in additional tax revenue. A frustrated Boehner no longer believed he could trust the president’s word, and he walked away. Obama moved the goal posts, is the Republican mantra.
In the White House’s telling of the story, Obama and Boehner did indeed settle on a rough framework for a deal, but it was all part of a fluid negotiation, and additional revenue was just one of the options on the table — not a last-minute demand. And while the president stood resolute against pressure from his own party, Boehner crumpled when challenged by the more radical members in his caucus. According to this version, Boehner made up the story about a late-breaking demand as a way of extricating himself from the negotiations, because he realized he couldn’t bring recalcitrant Republicans along. Boehner couldn’t deliver, is what Democrats have repeatedly said.
Doctor Fate wrote:RJ cites Bai's article:The Republican version of reality goes, briefly, like this: Boehner and Obama shook hands on a far-reaching deal to rewrite the tax code, roll back the cost of entitlements and slash deficits. But then Obama, reacting to pressure from Democrats in Congress, panicked at the last minute and suddenly demanded that Republicans accede to hundreds of billions of dollars in additional tax revenue. A frustrated Boehner no longer believed he could trust the president’s word, and he walked away. Obama moved the goal posts, is the Republican mantra.
In the White House’s telling of the story, Obama and Boehner did indeed settle on a rough framework for a deal, but it was all part of a fluid negotiation, and additional revenue was just one of the options on the table — not a last-minute demand. And while the president stood resolute against pressure from his own party, Boehner crumpled when challenged by the more radical members in his caucus. According to this version, Boehner made up the story about a late-breaking demand as a way of extricating himself from the negotiations, because he realized he couldn’t bring recalcitrant Republicans along. Boehner couldn’t deliver, is what Democrats have repeatedly said.
So, either Boehner lied or Obama reneged?
Reading between the lines, I don't think it was either one. "Fluid negotiation" is the key phrase. I think the White House had an overall framework in mind and were determined to get more in taxes than Boehner was willing to give, but hoped, as they had in the past, to trap him into a political corner. I think Boehner came to realize that "good faith" was absent and extricated himself.
There are two very clear and principled reasons Republicans don't want to raise taxes: 1) They know history--spending cuts don't happen and tax increases do; 2) The President and Democrats have raised the budget on the order of 30% over the last three-plus years. There is ample room for real cuts, but Democrats won't do it. Period.
You can blame Norquist if you like, but what real, actual, genuine cuts are Democrats willing to make? The answer, when you cut through the fog, is "There are none other than defense."
[/quote][snip] Cantor also didn’t trust the White House to stand by a deal, warning that they would ultimately come back with more demands...