Machiavelli wrote:Dan, I'll hazard a guess on the date. I reckon that by January 1, 2013, France and Germany will no longer be using the same currency as Italy and Spain.

Please don't hesitate to ask for that care package should you end up needing it. I understand you Brits are fond of baked beans. I'll be happy to send you a case or two.

The Fed is going to have to make very substantial cuts in the general level of interest rates if it is going to have any chance of preserving financial stability and avoiding an extremely serious recession. It will do that, even if it does not yet realise just how much it is going to have to do, because its mandate will make it do it. The Fed was created, in response to the 1907 financial crisis in the US, precisely to try to avoid further crises. And, whatever mistakes Greenspan may have made, he just got it wrong: he didn't deliberately set up this Greek Tragedy.

In contrast, the EU quite deliberately created the most dangerous credit bubble of all: EMU. And, whereas the mission of the Fed is to avoid a financial crisis, the mission of the ECB is to provoke one. The purpose of the crisis will be, as Prodi, then Commission president, said in 2002, to allow the EU to take more power for itself. The sacrificial victims will be, in the first instance, families and firms (and banks and investors) in countries such as Ireland and Club Med. Subsequently, German savers (or British taxpayers) will bear the burden of bailouts that a newly-empowered "EU economic government" will ordain.

The mechanism is plain to see. Germany entered the euro with an overvalued exchange rate. It then faced a long period of high unemployment that drove wages down and restored its competitive position. But Germany was also helped at the beginning of this process by the newly-established ECB, then dominated by the Bundesbank president, Tietmeyer, and his acolyte, Trichet, then governor of the Banque de France. The ECB initially set interest rates where Germany needed them - far too low for most other EMU countries - and allowed extreme euro weakness.

That combination, and Germany's initial uncompetitiveness, created booms in many other EMU countries. But, as in the US in the 1920 and again in the 1990s, inappropriate interest rates and temporarily booming growth totally distorted perceptions of today versus tomorrow. The result has been that firms and families in these countries have massively over-borrowed and banks and investors have massively over-lent, often on the illusory security of inflated house prices.

Several of these countries have built up enormous current account deficits. They are now the ones that over the next decade will have to restore competitiveness. But, trapped in EMU, they can do that only through unemployment and wage reductions. Very high unemployment and deflation will make debts simply unpayable. But, trapped in EMU, these countries cannot do for themselves what Greenspan did and Bernanke will have to do - slash interest rates. And Tietmeyer's successor, Weber, will be striving to ensure the ECB does not do it for them. The resulting carnage in the financial system of the whole euro area will make the present global financial crisis, serious though it is, seem almost insignificant.

Eventually, when things have got bad enough, the German public will be forced to acquiesce in lowered interest rates and high German inflation. But by then the EU will have taken the opportunity to seize control of the financial system (cheerfully punishing the London financial "casino" in the process), dictate budgetary policies, extort bail-out transfers from countries such as Britain and impose exchange controls with the rest of the world (and even, as reportedly threatened in a 1998 meeting of the EU Employment Committee, impose exit taxes - expropriation of life savings - on people seeking to flee the EU). And it will seek to "democratise" this power grab by instituting an emergency "European government".

Would Britain resist? The revived "constitution" now being rammed through allows future constitutional changes to be made just on the say-so of a cabal of heads of government, with no need for ratification. Would any British prime minister be prepared - or be allowed - to do his duty and say no in such a carefully-manufactured emergency?

The history of the past fifty years offers no reassurance whatsoever.