Ray Jay wrote:all good background ... I'm just saying that Obama decided to be passive in his approach to Syria and a consequence is that ISIS became strong and is now a threat to Iraq. I don't know whether he could have had a successful negotiation to keep more U.S. forces in Iraq; however, the latest crisis is partially the result of Obama's passiveness re Syria, no?

danivon wrote:

Ray Jay wrote:all good background ... I'm just saying that Obama decided to be passive in his approach to Syria and a consequence is that ISIS became strong and is now a threat to Iraq. I don't know whether he could have had a successful negotiation to keep more U.S. forces in Iraq; however, the latest crisis is partially the result of Obama's passiveness re Syria, no?

My point was that ISIS was already a threat to Iraq.

Had the US or West intervened in Syria, it may have made it harder for the Syrian government to oppose ISIS in Syria. Or it may have helped the other Syrian opposition groups to oppose ISIS. I don't know that you can be sure that non-intervention led to ISIS's growth (or that it would but would not have had another nasty consequence). Seems like a post-hoc application of x happened then y, therefore x caused y, which assumes correlation and causation are the same thing.

I do think it is better than Bush's policies, but there is a growing arc of instability in the Islamic world and it is fair game to wonder whether U.S. retreat (as evidenced by not following through on the Syrian red line) is part of the problem. We cannot prove it although it certainly feels that way when we read the news.

President Obama’s announcement on Friday that all American troops would leave Iraq by the end of the year was an occasion for celebration for many, but some top American military officials were dismayed by the announcement, seeing it as the president’s putting the best face on a breakdown in tortured negotiations with the Iraqis.

And for the negotiators who labored all year to avoid that outcome, it represented the triumph of politics over the reality of Iraq’s fragile security’s requiring some troops to stay, a fact everyone had assumed would prevail. But officials also held out hope that after the withdrawal, the two countries could restart negotiations more productively, as two sovereign nations.

This year, American military officials had said they wanted a “residual” force of as many as tens of thousands of American troops to remain in Iraq past 2011 as an insurance policy against any violence. Those numbers were scaled back, but the expectation was that at least about 3,000 to 5,000 American troops would remain.

At the end of the Bush administration, when the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA, was negotiated, setting 2011 as the end of the United States’ military role, officials had said the deadline was set for political reasons, to put a symbolic end to the occupation and establish Iraq’s sovereignty. But there was an understanding, a senior official here said, that a sizable American force would stay in Iraq beyond that date.

Over the last year, in late-night meetings at the fortified compound of the Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani, and in videoconferences between Baghdad and Washington, American and Iraqi negotiators had struggled to reach an agreement. All the while, both Mr. Obama and the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, gave the world a wink and nod, always saying that Iraq was ready to stand on its own but never fully closing the door on the possibility of American troops’ staying on.

Through the summer, American officials continued to assume that the agreement would be amended, and Mr. Obama was willing to support a continued military presence. In June, diplomats and Iraqi officials said that Mr. Obama had told Mr. Maliki that he was prepared to leave up to 10,000 soldiers to continue training and equipping the Iraqi security forces. Mr. Maliki agreed, but said he needed time to line up political allies.

Mr. Maliki was afraid that if he came out publicly in favor of keeping troops without gaining the support of other parties in Parliament, his rivals — particularly the former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi — would exploit the issue to weaken his shaky coalition government. Eventually, he got authorization from the group to begin talks with the Americans on keeping troops in Iraq.

In August, after debates between the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House, the Americans settled on the 3,000 to 5,000 number, which was reported in August. According to two people briefed on the matter, one inside the administration and one outside, the arguments of two White House officials, Thomas E. Donilon, the national security adviser, and his deputy, Denis McDonough, prevailed over those of the military.

Intelligence assessments that Iraq was not at great risk of slipping into chaos in the absence of American forces were a factor in the decision, an American official said.

This month, American officials pressed the Iraqi leadership to meet again at President Talabani’s compound to discuss the issue. This time the Americans asked them to take a stand on the question of immunity for troops, hoping to remove what had always been the most difficult hurdle. But they misread Iraqi politics and the Iraqi public. Still burdened by the traumas of this and previous wars, and having watched the revolutions sweeping their region, the Iraqis were unwilling to accept anything that infringed on their sovereignty.

Acutely aware of that sentiment, the Iraqi leadership quickly said publicly that they would not support legal protections for any American troops. Some American officials have privately said that pushing for that meeting — in essence forcing the Iraqis to take a public stand on such a controversial matter before working out the politics of presenting it to their constituents and to Parliament — was a severe tactical mistake that ended any possibility of keeping American troops here past December. (bold added)

The three problematic claims:

[1] Any residual U.S. force we might have left in Iraq would have been minimal and in a non-combat role, somewhere on the order of 2–3,000 [troops]. . . . [2] We could not have stayed unless the Iraqi government let us stay — Iraq is a sovereign nation and the al-Maliki government wanted American troops to leave. . . . [3] The status-of-forces agreement, the basic framework upon which American withdrawal was based, came from the administration of George W. Bush.

These claims don’t jibe with what we know about how the negotiations with Iraq went. It’s the White House itself that decided just 2–3,000 troops made sense, when the Defense Department and others were proposing more. Maliki was willing to accept a deal with U.S. forces if it was worth it to him — the problem was that the Obama administration wanted a small force so that it could say it had ended the war. Having a very small American force wasn’t worth the domestic political price Maliki would have to pay for supporting their presence. In other words, it’s not correct that “the al-Maliki government wanted American troops to leave.” That contradicts the reporting that’s been done on the issue by well-known neocon propaganda factories The New Yorker and the New York Times. Prime Minister Maliki did say in public, at times, that he personally couldn’t offer the guarantees necessary to keep U.S. troops in the country, but it’s well-established that behind closed doors, he was interested in a substantial U.S. presence. The Obama administration, in fact, doesn’t even really deny it: For Dexter Filkins’s New Yorker story, deputy national-security adviser Ben Rhodes didn’t dispute this issue, he just argued that a U.S. troop presence wouldn’t have been a panacea.

And Hayes’s third point, that the Bush administration signed the status-of-forces agreement that included U.S. troops’ leaving at the end of 2011, is utterly meaningless: The agreement was supposed to be renegotiated eventually, to provide a long-term presence with U.S. troops in a different role. That’s why the Obama administration, however half-heartedly and with little regard for the fate of Iraq, did try to renegotiate it. And it’s why the Maliki government was open to these negotiations — the situation on the ground was very different in 2011 than it had been when Bush signed the agreement in 2008.

rickyp wrote:ray

I do think it is better than Bush's policies, but there is a growing arc of instability in the Islamic world and it is fair game to wonder whether U.S. retreat (as evidenced by not following through on the Syrian red line) is part of the problem. We cannot prove it although it certainly feels that way when we read the news.

Maybe that's because the news you get is through a prism that distorts the influence of the US.
A news that imagines that the US can actually control events, and doesn't have to understand that sometimes it can't even influence let alone control. (See the notion that Obama could have successfully renegotiated Bush's SOFA if only he'd said the right things or made the right threats...)

Bush invaded and occupied Iraq. The only period when things began to seem like Iraq was edging towards stability was the brief Sunni Awakening. Essentially the paying off of Sunni interests and a slightly ramped up military campaign against insurgents. The price to ensure this stability was not welcomed in the US nor was it in all reality sustainable. And both Sunnis and Shiites merely had to wait out the Americans and prepare for the oncoming conflict..

As soon as Bush's team had decided that they could not sustain a successful occupation of Iraq on the cheap - they found the most expedient way out... (See Bush SOFA negotations)

Blaming Obama for not getting involved (in syria or Iraq now) when the cost of a successful involvement would be enormous and long lasting is ridiculous. There is no domestic political appetite for a World War scale involvement and Marshall plan scale occupation . And that's what it would take to have a lasting resolution to the Sunni- Shiite conflict. And that's essentially whats going on and has been going on intermittently since what 950AD?

If any lessons were learnt in Iraq and Afghanistan its that lasting solutions require enormous military and economic involvement and commitment. Limited involvement only creates limited short term results. Sometimes that's enough (see Libya) if the goal is limited. Usually its a waste of lives,and money .
Whats the goal in Syria and Iraq? The elimination of Assad? What does that bring today? The elimination of ISIS? That cements Assad in power, as ISIS is the most effective military opposing him.
Supporting Maliki's government The only state allies in the region for Iran?

Its too @#$! complex to criticize Obama for anything... especially since he inherited the mess and is dealing the best he can with an obstructive opposition that hasn't seemed to learn a thing from the failure of the Iraq invasion. I mean, who listens to John Mccain and Lyndsey Graham anymore?
American news media.... Which brings me back to my first line. Maybe that's because the news you get is through a prism that distorts the influence of the US.

rickyp wrote:ray

I do think it is better than Bush's policies, but there is a growing arc of instability in the Islamic world and it is fair game to wonder whether U.S. retreat (as evidenced by not following through on the Syrian red line) is part of the problem. We cannot prove it although it certainly feels that way when we read the news.

Maybe that's because the news you get is through a prism that distorts the influence of the US.
A news that imagines that the US can actually control events, and doesn't have to understand that sometimes it can't even influence let alone control. (See the notion that Obama could have successfully renegotiated Bush's SOFA if only he'd said the right things or made the right threats...)

Bush invaded and occupied Iraq. The only period when things began to seem like Iraq was edging towards stability was the brief Sunni Awakening. Essentially the paying off of Sunni interests and a slightly ramped up military campaign against insurgents. The price to ensure this stability was not welcomed in the US nor was it in all reality sustainable. And both Sunnis and Shiites merely had to wait out the Americans and prepare for the oncoming conflict..

As soon as Bush's team had decided that they could not sustain a successful occupation of Iraq on the cheap - they found the most expedient way out... (See Bush SOFA negotations)

Blaming Obama for not getting involved (in syria or Iraq now) when the cost of a successful involvement would be enormous and long lasting is ridiculous. There is no domestic political appetite for a World War scale involvement and Marshall plan scale occupation .

And that's what it would take to have a lasting resolution to the Sunni- Shiite conflict. And that's essentially whats going on and has been going on intermittently since what 950AD?

If any lessons were learnt in Iraq and Afghanistan its that lasting solutions require enormous military and economic involvement and commitment.

Limited involvement only creates limited short term results. Sometimes that's enough (see Libya) if the goal is limited. Usually its a waste of lives,and money .

Whats the goal in Syria and Iraq? The elimination of Assad?

What does that bring today? The elimination of ISIS? That cements Assad in power, as ISIS is the most effective military opposing him.

Supporting Maliki's government The only state allies in the region for Iran?

Its too @#$! complex to criticize Obama for anything... especially since he inherited the mess and is dealing the best he can with an obstructive opposition that hasn't seemed to learn a thing from the failure of the Iraq invasion.

He actually said the wrong things and put Maliki in a untenable position by making public what was not ready to be presented.

Politically, Maliki could not accept the Americans' Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) granting immunity to American military personnel from Iraqi laws, not after the many killings of innocents at the hands of the Americans and their contractors, (such as Haditha), which enraged Iraqi public opinion. He also couldn't sign a SOFA with the United States giving Americans carte blanche to do as they please in Iraq when millions of his own people already believed he was a US puppet

Can the US control all events? No, but we can create a vacuum by publicly removing our "hands" from a given situation

rickyp wrote:fate

He actually said the wrong things and put Maliki in a untenable position by making public what was not ready to be presented.

Try viewing it from the Iraqis perspective. Support for any American presence had been made untenable by the American occupation. periood.

Politically, Maliki could not accept the Americans' Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) granting immunity to American military personnel from Iraqi laws, not after the many killings of innocents at the hands of the Americans and their contractors, (such as Haditha), which enraged Iraqi public opinion. He also couldn't sign a SOFA with the United States giving Americans carte blanche to do as they please in Iraq when millions of his own people already believed he was a US puppet

Fate

Can the US control all events? No, but we can create a vacuum by publicly removing our "hands" from a given situation

You misunderstand the term "creates a vacuum' if you apply it to everyone of these situations.

The US doesn't create a vacuum unless it has a very significant presence and leaves. (hat would be true in Iraq)

It doesn't create a vacuum by not committing forces.

The US influence in Egypt was military aid, and diplomatic influence. These would be what you call "hands".

You have to be unbelievable arrogant to believe that this "influence" counters the democratic uprising and the demonstrations and civil unrest in the streets of Cairo. The US doesn't control the democratic expression of the mass of Egyptians in any way.

Idiom: Nature abhors a vacuum

Idiom Definitions for 'Nature abhors a vacuum'

This idiom is used to express the idea that empty or unfilled spaces are unnatural as they go against the laws of nature and physics.

He could have done as other Presidents have done: let the strong man stay in office. Again, it may be the moral high ground, but it is foolish to imagine that this would be contained within Egypt.

I see nothing here regarding Syria or Libya.

Again, in each situation, President Obama made statements and choices. He directly or indirectly influenced events. He is responsible for that. Had he chosen a different path, there would have been different results.

rickyp wrote:Fate

He could have done as other Presidents have done: let the strong man stay in office. Again, it may be the moral high ground, but it is foolish to imagine that this would be contained within Egypt.

Your saying "let"? Really? he had the power and authority to "let" him stay in office?
That's delusional.

Events in Cairo came about because of Egyptians actions. Period.

Until now, the street demonstrations in Egypt demanding Mubarak's ouster had drawn a measured U.S. response that advocated step-by-step reforms for pro-democracy changes while maintaining stability.

This week, though, calls increased for the Obama administration to push for Mubarak to step aside immediately or announce he would not be a candidate in the next presidential election scheduled for September.

One of Egypt's leading opposition figures, Mohamed ElBaradei, warned Monday that the United States needed to "let go" of its longtime ally.

I see nothing here regarding Syria or Libya.

The intervention in Libya had limited goals, and achieved them. Greater involvement in Libya than what is current, (CIA presence) would achieve nothing but Libyan resentment.

Syria required a substantial commitment along the lines of a major invasion and occupation if anything was going to be accomplished.

Again, in each situation, President Obama made statements and choices. He directly or indirectly influenced events. He is responsible for that. Had he chosen a different path, there would have been different results.

Well, this is a broad statement that is true.But the specifics you offer, are threadbare.

And the notion that there was any kind of support in the US for more than what has been done is as delusional as John McCain.

In other words, we pushed him out

What we do know is that "freeing" the Arabs from their cruel dictators (Saddam, Qaddafi, and Mubarak, while attempting to get rid of Assad) has had unintended consequences--and they're not pleasant.

The US lost face

rickyp wrote:fate

In other words, we pushed him out

.

Oh sure. And you think, regardless whatever was going on in Cairo, until the US took a position nothing was going to happen.
Arrogant twaddle. The US was a spectator not a participant.

Us (sic) media has you trained.

American news gives you a sketchy overview of whats happening somewhere else in the world, then immediately goes inot "how this afects the US", and "what should the US do about this?" The it inevitably brings out two idiots to repsent thee "two" sides of the deabate.
As if there are always only 2 sides.

Fate

What we do know is that "freeing" the Arabs from their cruel dictators (Saddam, Qaddafi, and Mubarak, while attempting to get rid of Assad) has had unintended consequences--and they're not pleasant.

Living under the thumb of the 4 wasn't pleasant either. Is the US guilty of sole responsibility for the 4 managing to maintain their bloodthirsty regimes for so many years?

The people responsible for freeing themselves from Qadaffi and Mubarak were either Libyan or Egyptian.

Denials of al-Qaeda membership were issued by the rebels.[149] Gaddafi's claims are supported by a secret cable to the State Department from the US embassy in Tripoli in 2008 and an analysis by the Combating Terrorism Center at the US Military Academy at West Point of a set of documents called the Sinjar Records, purporting to show a statistical study of the al-Qaeda personnel records. The West Point analysis of these documents concluded that Libya provided "far more" foreign fighters in per capita terms than any other country.[150] A disclosed file from 2005 on WikiLeaks found that rebel leader Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamuda Bin Qumu was a former Guantanamo Bay detainee alleged to be a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, to have joined the Taliban in 1998, and that he was a “probable member of Al Qaida and a member of the African Extremist Network.”

When the US has acted as in Iraq, the consequences were horrific.

You say that the US shouldn't have invaded iraq.... and yet you seem to belabour the point that Obama is reluctant to involve the US anywhere else militarily....

Fate

The US lost face

Sure that's the key reason why Syria is in flames.
Its all about the US and its loss of face...