To tack a combination exclamation point and question mark onto this thread:

The U.S. military has halted the training of some Afghan forces [a small fraction of the country's security forces] while it digs deeper into their background... ...the international coalition ultimately hopes to recheck the backgrounds of the entire 350,000-strong Afghan army and police.

I'm no expert on counterespionage efforts within a counterinsurgency, but I have to imagine that the telltale signs in the backgrounds of Afghans that would allow one to distinguish friend from foe would be subtle indeed.

...measures include a more intense vetting system for new recruits, increasing the number of people working in counter-intelligence, the re-vetting of Afghan soldiers as they return from leave, a ban on the sale of uniforms and the establishment of an anonymous reporting system...

I want to believe that it's worth our while (in blood, gold and lost opportunities) to remain in Afghanistan, that there's ultimate good to be accomplished, and that we can accomplish it. Stories like this one, however, paint a picture... No, let me amend that. This story just adds a touch of shading to the picture. This is not a big story, but it's the kind that really makes one wonder what the hell we think we're doing.

We're training Afghan forces? To do what? These people know how to fight. We're not giving them F-22s to fly or Abrams tanks to drive around. We're training them to fight as light infantry in an organized, systematic, rules-of-engagement sort of way - to fight like we do. Then, once they've got the rudiments of that down, we're going to pull out and let them have themselves a nice little civil war. They'd probably do just as well fighting in the ways they're used to. In the meantime, by flooding them with dollars and bureaucracy we're creating all the conditions necessary for rampant corruption. In that we've succeeded wonderfully (not that they needed much help).

It's a head-shaker.

source

The Doctor of Fate said,

"If we leave and terrorist camps spring up, we hit them with missiles. Period. Our policy should be announced on the way out: we are not responsible for innocent lives lost near terror training grounds. If you don't want to die, stay away from terrorists."

I absolutely agree with this approach.

The Iraqi war and occupation was immoral and illegal. For that reason and a few others I voted for Obama. He promised to get us out of there and for the most part he has.

Although the Afghani war was moral and legal I've never been in favor of boots on the ground for an extended period of time. Set up a containment policy and use our technology to watch, interpret and bomb bad behavior.

Unless we intend to set up shop to have a better strategic foothold in the Middle East that will make us less dependent on Israel or Turkey let's get out.

Well purple, we could probably just check all their FB and linkedin accouts to sort out who's who.

The US has been using warlords more and more in the fight against the Taliban. I can't help but wonder if that sort of thing has fueled these internal attacks on US troops.

neil

The US has been using warlords more and more in the fight against the Taliban

.

More and more? Don't you remmeber recent history? In the original invasion it was almost all the warlords... The presence of the west was limited. Mostly air power and special forces...
There was some chance for Afghanistan in the beginning. What would have been required is over whelming force and a complete occupation of much of the state. The occupations goal would be protecting the establishment of communities that included institutions that allowed Afghans to prosper, Schools, fair systems of law and the protection of private property. The protection of individuals rights from oppressive religious and tribal elites. Essentially transforming Afghanistan from the middle ages forcibly.
None of that happened. Perhaps becasue an occupation where the occupiers can't communicate to the local populace is doomed? Instad, a corrupt groups was chosen to head a new ruling oligarch. They proceeded to line their pockets and pay lip service to the western forces that put them back into power.
Meanwhile, some western forces did have limtied success in limited areas where they made conditions better for the local populace. But as soon as they talk of getting out, the local populcae knows that the Taliban will be back...
Changing a society is a generational exercise. A generation has to grow up knowing only the better way of life.. The cost, may have always been too high. But after the US and UK invaded Iraq, the cost of the two conflicts became far too great.
By the way, the rules of engagement had nothing to do with the failure. The idea is that an occupying force has the same or even more respect for the lives and property of the populace as they do for their own people. Without a commitment to that philosophy and daily demonstration to that philosophy the occupying force can never gain the trust of the local populace. Thats human nature.
Today, probably the best choice is treating Afghnistan as if it were part of the tribal areas of Pakistan. Perhpas one day, the locals will rise up and make the change required by themselves.

So now it's time to 'cut and run'?

I'm not sure what the best course for the West is, but I would think that gradual disengagement is more manageable from all sides than getting straight out.

As much as using drones and missiles may satisfy some 'hardware' urge, I'm not sure it's really sustainable. And as we have seen all too often, innocent civilians will sometimes get targeted. Ok, so the blowback from that won't be immediate and against troops on the ground in Afghanistan if there's been a pull-out, but let's not pretend there would not be some blowback somewhere.

danivon wrote:So now it's time to 'cut and run'?

It's time to stop having (mostly) American troops die for no discernible reason.

President Obama has set a deadline. Meanwhile, what will change between now and that deadline? More Afghans will be trained to fight a form of warfare they will eschew as soon as we leave, AND more (mostly) Americans will die, some of them at the hands of those they just trained. For what purpose?

danivon wrote:So now it's time to 'cut and run'? --- I would think that gradual disengagement is more manageable from all sides than getting straight out.

Precisely what we thought in Vietnam - and were wrong. "Cut and run" is a string of words designed to sound bad. Should we avoid doing something wise because it sounds bad? The only reason we stayed in Vietnam those last couple of years was to avoid the "dishonor" of cutting (our losses) and running (expeditiously away from a costly no-win situation). The eventual exit in Vietnam was no more graceful than a "cut and run" years earlier would have been. And we did not accomplish enough in those last years to justify the expense of staying there.

What is it about gradual disengagement that would make it more manageable? I'm not suggesting we turn tail in panic. An organized retreat should take a LOT less than two years. We can use this winter - the "off-season" - to pack our bags and be gone before spring. The only reason to stay two years more is to accomplish something important. Do you think we can? I'd love it if we could. I'm open-minded... lay out a case.

And I'm not suggesting we clear out lock, stock and barrel. I imagine we'll leave behind some special forces and some liaison guys. Maybe we could even maintain an air base behind lots of barbed wire - all Afghans to be disarmed at the main gate before entry.

Are US forces 'losing', though? Certainly in Vietnam that was the case, as the North gradually was able to push down and infiltrate the South. Is that actually analogous to Afghanistan?

Looking at the fatality figures, things seem to be improving compared to a couple of years ago. 2010 saw the most US deaths. 2009 saw the highest death rate (compared to the size of the deployment). Last year fatalities were down and the troop numbers higher. This year so far has been less costly than Jan-Aug in the previous two years.

(sources - http://icasualties.org/oef for monthly fatalities, http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs ... stan-index for deployment numbers)

This is despite reaction to the January urination video, February Koran burnings and March's massacre alleged to have been carried out by Staff Sergeant Bales.

There are still war aims outstanding, including making the country safe enough for the return of many refugees. To leave that unresolved may in the short term seem like a way out, but there are risks. One is that it allows the Taliban and allies to secure southern Afghanistan and also to work with the insurgents in Pakistan. The long term consequences don't seem particularly appealing, and remote strike would be limited as a means of dealing with it.

As far as I'm aware, on the ground the coalition forces have limited the insurgents and have been pushing them back and clearing areas, while at the same time training up local forces and police. The latter, however, has been a problem. In order to avoid delays in recruiting, some vetting procedures have been missed, and even full vetting would not guarantee that no 'mole' could get in, and even less that an Afghan would not turn on NATO troops for other reasons (I was hearing last week about a case where a British soldier was shot, but it did not appear to be Taliban as much as corrupt local police involved with drugs).

danivon

Are US forces 'losing', though?

define winning.

In a normal war that would mean contorl of territory and resources.
The problem in Afghanistan is that even when the US and Nato control an area, it just means that the corrupt Afghan government is in control. The government in Kabul offers little to most Afghans . choosing between them and the Taliban is a meagre option.
What that means is the populace is non-committal. And without a committed populace supporting the occupiers, the winning is losing as soon as they leave an area.
The similarity to the South Vietnamese experience is that much of the SV govenrment and army was corrupt. Kabul is worse probably.
By trying to invade adn occupy on the cheap, and by eschewing a direct and difficult occupation for the cheap choice of choosing one of the former memebrs of the corrupt oligarch to prop up, all that has happened was musical chairs...
remarkably similar to the Soviets experience in Afghanistan.

danivon wrote:Looking at the fatality figures, things seem to be improving...

If you were the Taliban and knew that we'd be leaving in 2014 at the latest, would you risk life and limb in offensive operations to maximize coalition fatalities, or would you play more of a waiting game?

Your comment can't fail to remind me how we measured progress in Vietnam via body counts. In your case you're looking at limiting the count of our bodies rather than maximizing the count of the enemy's but the problem is the same: you're using the wrong yardstick. In Vietnam victory meant permanently keeping communism north of the seventeenth parallel. Body counts had some relevance to that goal, but not ultimate relevance, and didn't really correlate well to what counted, which was the comparative morale of the opposing indigenous forces and what the local populations were willing to risk their livelihoods for. In Afghanistan we can count the number of people we've officially "trained" and gotten into uniforms, but can we expect them to proudly and bravely wear those uniforms once we're gone, the paychecks become less reliable, and the front line gets closer to home?

In Afghanistan victory means establishing a local power structure that will, without constantly needing more support than we're able or willing to give, remain at least modestly pro-Western and be able to keep anti-Western forces from using any part of the country as a meaningful base of operations. The government currently in place barely qualifies as modestly pro-Western; do we think it will become more so after we leave? We had the Taliban all but entirely defeated in 2002 yet they reconstituted. Do we expect to run them out in the next 26 months the way we did in 2002? And in such a way as to prevent reconstitution? We do not. We know we can't. Do we really expect the Afghan forces we're training to be able (not to mention willing) to complete that task? We do not.

And so we're trying to arrange "peace talks" that will center on some form of "power-sharing". But allowing the Taliban to retain any real power amounts for all intents and purposes to defeat if you assume that the Taliban's retained ultimate goal is more or less what it's been from the beginning. We're not going to turn them benign by being "reasonable" and getting paper concessions from them. We're trying to negotiate the terms of our defeat. Sound familiar?

[cross-posted with Ricky]

Purple wrote:If you were the Taliban and knew that we'd be leaving in 2014 at the latest, would you risk life and limb in offensive operations to maximize coalition fatalities, or would you play more of a waiting game?

Well, I'm not the Taliban. Equally the insurgency is not just the Taliban (there are various factions). And they are still attacking coalition forces and defending the areas where they are active.

What has happened though over the past few years is that the areas in which they are active have been reduced - not to zero, and not smoothly - which would appear to be another measure of at least not losing.

Your comment can't fail to remind me how we measured progress in Vietnam via body counts. In your case you're looking at limiting the count of our bodies rather than maximizing the count of the enemy's but the problem is the same: you're using the wrong yardstick. In Vietnam victory meant permanently keeping communism north of the seventeenth parallel. Body counts had some relevance to that goal, but not ultimate relevance, and didn't really correlate well to what counted, which was the comparative morale of the opposing indigenous forces and what the local populations were willing to risk their livelihoods for. In Afghanistan we can count the number of people we've officially "trained" and gotten into uniforms, but can we expect them to proudly and bravely wear those uniforms once we're gone, the paychecks become less reliable, and the front line gets closer to home?

Well, except that the difference is that in Vietnam the US did not venture above the 17th parallel, but in Afghanistan they are attemting (along with allies and the Afghans) to control as much of the country as possible.

Also, the reason I went and looked at the fatalities was to see what the current 'price' was that prompted the original topic. Every dead soldier is a tragedy, but it is welcome that we are seeing fewer tragedies than before, is it not?

In Afghanistan victory means establishing a local power structure that will, without constantly needing more support than we're able or willing to give, remain at least modestly pro-Western and be able to keep anti-Western forces from using any part of the country as a meaningful base of operations.

They don't have to be 'pro-western' to be anti-Taliban. I don't set the bar so high - I would say that victory would mean establishing a power structure that will remain pro-Afghan and able to defend itself.

And 'not losing' would be getting close to that without significantly greater loss off life.

The government currently in place barely qualifies as modestly pro-Western; do we think it will become more so after we leave?

There will be somewhat less pressure on them if there are not so many idiots in US uniform doing things like filming themselves urinating on the dead, I guess. Like I say, it's not that they have to be 'pro-Western', so much as not 'anti-Western' and able to unite at least most of the country.

We had the Taliban all but entirely defeated in 2002 yet they reconstituted. Do we expect to run them out in the next 26 months the way we did in 2002? And in such a way as to prevent reconstitution? We do not. We know we can't.

I do not. It didn't actually happen in 2002 - what really happened was that we pretended that had happened so that plans for Iraq would not be hampered, and we ignored what was happening in Pakistan - where much of them went and not only regrouped, but started an insurgency there.

Do we really expect the Afghan forces we're training to be able (not to mention willing) to complete that task? We do not.

You may not, but I think they would be willing in large part, and be able at least to win the 'hearts and minds' side of things being local and not foreigners (which a lot of pro-Taliban forces are not, just as coalition troops are not)

And so we're trying to arrange "peace talks" that will center on some form of "power-sharing". But allowing the Taliban to retain any real power amounts for all intents and purposes to defeat if you assume that the Taliban's retained ultimate goal is more or less what it's been from the beginning. We're not going to turn them benign by being "reasonable" and getting paper concessions from them. We're trying to negotiate the terms of our defeat. Sound familiar?

Well the Taliban are not homogeneous, and the insurgency itself is far more nebulous. It would be foolish to ignore the strongly held beliefs of a large number of Afghans when considering who rules it and how. It would also appear to be dangerous to think that we can impose a 'pro-western' rule or that we'd want to in order to 'win'.

And let us remember, we are not there to fight a war on our own behalf - we are there to assist the Afghan government. If they want to negotiate, that is for them. We can certainly suggest they not give too much away, but we should really be looking to end the bloodshed on all sides if possible.

Look at Northern Ireland. We have power sharing there. It's not perfect, but it's a lot better than before the 1990s.

I think it's worth remembering what state Afghanistan was in prior to the war. It was essentially split between the Taliban, who are largely Pashtun, and the rump of the Northern Alliance forces, who were mostly Tajiks, Kazakhs and other minority ethnicities. The Taliban forces were in the ascendancy but they still hadn't achieved control of the whole country and didn't seem likely to. As such it seems inconceivable that they could do so now if Western forces were to withdraw, because the old NA warlords have been substantially re-armed and many Pashtuns have joined forces with them to form the new government. I'm guessing the Taliban leadership know this, so they're likely to look for some form of power sharing agreement rather than push for all out victory. You can be sure that the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan, which so far as I know make up not far off half the population and who have been in charge for the last 10 years, are not going to just roll over once the Americans withdraw.

danivon wrote:And let us remember, we are not there to fight a war on our own behalf - we are there to assist the Afghan government. If they want to negotiate, that is for them. We can certainly suggest they not give too much away, but we should really be looking to end the bloodshed on all sides if possible.

Totally true.

However, do you believe if we leave Karzai and company will hang on to power? If not, what are we doing?

If so, we are fighting (and dying) to keep a corrupt, drug-selling government in power?

Is there anything remotely resembling a "victory" possible? Anything worth seeing more troops injured, maimed or killed?

Not to me.