Interesting. One snippet:

“We were very close,” Olmert told me, “more than ever in the past, to complete an agreement on principles that would have led to the end of the conflict between us and the Palestinians.” Abbas said the talks produced more “creative ideas” than any in the past. He took pains to assure me that he had been most flexible on Israel’s security demands. Olmert, in retrospect, agrees, saying that Abbas “had never said no.”

It's certainly a different story that the one you told us from careful selections from Rice's piece.

Hold on there. Every quotation is selective. Every article is selective. You cannot quote everything. There is nothing wrong about quoting selectively to prove your point. Your suggesting that it shows lack of integrity is very disturbing and shows your junk, and not mine.

Your narrative is different than mine. But that doesn't mean that my quotes have to conform to your narrative. My quotes conform to my narrative which is that the Palestinians had another opportunity to have a state of their own, and chose not to take it because they think a better deal is out there.

That point is supported by Rice's book. I bet that point is supported by the Palestinian Papers published by Al Jazeera, but there's a lot to read there. If you want to make a different point, feel free. You have chosen to focus on the imperfection of Israel and other matters. That's fine. That's relevant; but it doesn't contradict my central point which is confirmed by the NY Times fuller description. Here are my (intentionally selective) quotes from the NY times article that support my point:

Olmert insisted that he had conceded to Abbas every major demand Palestinians had made for decades: a border based scrupulously on the 1967 lines, a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem and “recognition of the problem” of refugees. “I was ready to take complete responsibility and move forward forcefully,” Olmert told me. “I believed, I still believe, that I would have broken through all the barriers and won over public opinion in this country and the world.”

THE ISSUES THAT were supposed to be intractable — demilitarization of the Palestinian state, the status of Jerusalem and the right of return of Palestinian refugees — proved susceptible to creative thinking. Even on borders, Olmert and Abbas were able to agree on fundamentals: a desire to disrupt as few lives as possible and to maximize the contiguity (and therefore the economic possibility) of Palestinian cities. “We didn’t waste a minute during our months of negotiation,” Abbas said.
...
The negotiations on borders ended here, with Olmert telling Abbas among other things that no Israeli prime minister could ever remove Ariel, and Abbas telling Olmert that no Palestinian president could ever accept it. “I told him, ‘Sign,’ ” Olmert said. “ ‘You will never get a better proposal from any Israeli government for the next 50 years.’ ” Abbas would not sign. He asked for Olmert’s map, which Olmert refused to give him unless he signed off on it. Olmert told me he thought Abbas delayed partly because he hoped to get a better deal on the map from an Obama administration. ...

Olmert made his most comprehensive offer to Abbas on Sept. 16, 2008, the opening day of the General Assembly in New York. Abbas then “went silent” (as Olmert puts it), weighing a response as the Gaza border was heating up, not sure which American presidency the Palestinian leadership would confront — and also questioning the point of continuing negotiations with a lame-duck prime minister. (Olmert was under investigation for corruption and announced in late July that he would be stepping aside once his Kadima Party chose a new leader.)

It seems to me that Abbas could have taken a deal. It would not have been perfect, but it is certainly better than what he has now. Frankly, if I were the leader of the Palestinians, I would have rushed to take that deal. Wouldn't you have? Time is not on their side.

Re the Kurds, Dan:

That is not 'the Kurds'. That is 'some of the Kurds'. There are also Kurds (perhaps more) in Turkey, Syria and Iran. You think they will be happy with just a Northern Iraq based state? And do you think Iraq wants to give away any territory to the Kurds? They are ok with autonomy, but independence (and the oilfields in that part of the country)?

I'm no expert on Kurdish history, but that's my point. The Kurds are a stateless people. When the western powers divided up the middle east, they purposefully divided the Kurds amongs many territories, all of which have excluded them from statehood, their culture, and their ethnicity to various degrees. But the Kurds have accepted limited autonomy in Iraq and are working towards a better answer primarily by working with the Iraqi government. I'm just contrasting their behavior to that of the Palestinians.

Well, looks like we all had it a bit wrong based on a somewhat incomplete recount of what happened from Rice. More importantly, this is great news that each side, negotiating in good faith, came so close. Time for a new attempt?
And by the way RJ it seems to me that it is in Israel's interests to make a deal. Blaming the Palestinians for not taking a deal which clearly was not finalized seems pointless. At the end of the day Israel should negotiate a deal because it is just to do so. That will resolve the remaining issue from 1948 and hopefully will effect a reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world. At the very least Israel would have done all that it could. The alternative, bunkering down into a protected enclave and contingent on US support and military power, is not very palliative.

Ray Jay wrote:Hold on there. Every quotation is selective. Every article is selective. You cannot quote everything. There is nothing wrong about quoting selectively to prove your point. Your suggesting that it shows lack of integrity is very disturbing and shows your junk, and not mine.

Well, when you use your quotes to put a point of view that's questioned - or even contradicted - by the parts you omitted, I don't see what's wrong with pointing that out.

And when I replied, it was after you'd scolded Ricky and Freeman for their questioning. You clearly are not happy to be 'scolded' back. Ho hum.

No, there's nothing wrong with selective quoting to make your point (of course, when the discovery of the selection undermines that point then it's highly debatable that you were able to 'prove' your point). Equally there's nothing wrong with placing those selected quotes back into context. That doesn't have to be about 'proving' a point, by the way.

Sure, quotes and articles will be selective/biased, etc. But don't get all stroppy when someone points out your bias. We could at least try to be objective?

Your narrative is different than mine. But that doesn't mean that my quotes have to conform to your narrative. My quotes conform to my narrative which is that the Palestinians had another opportunity to have a state of their own, and chose not to take it because they think a better deal is out there.

My 'narrative'? I'm looking at all of the thing you linked to and seeing that it wasn't that simple. I'm remembering that Olmert had zero credibility to be able to offer a deal - indeed the Rice article backs that up, and the NYT article suggests his idea was to 'ambush' his country by revealing it at the UN and at summits so it became a fait accompli by the time that Israel's politicians got around to debating it and before the upcoming elections.

Why should Abbas take up an offer that risked being completely savaged by the Likud (and others on the Israeli right)? Especially if it's not as good as he wants - it then becomes the new starting point, and he's made concessions before he gets back to negotiations (if any) with Netenyahu or Livni or whoever.

Seriously, the very 'weakness' of the Palestinian position is part of the reason they would not want to agree to a compromise - it would further weaken their position.

That point is supported by Rice's book. I bet that point is supported by the Palestinian Papers published by Al Jazeera, but there's a lot to read there. If you want to make a different point, feel free. You have chosen to focus on the imperfection of Israel and other matters. That's fine.

Again you put words into my mouth. I'm not talking about the 'imperfection' of Israel. I'm looking at the context of this, and what the offer really meant.

For example, it meant some of the largest and more contentious (and expanded massively posy-Oslo) settlements remaining. It's all very well saying "but it's only a few percent of the land, and we'd offer acreage to balance it", but we are talking about some which were strategically placed.

On the other hand, Abbas would have known that the deal would involve removing other settlements, which after Gaza would likely have met with hardline resistance in Israel, particularly among the settlers themselves.

Also, it seems that both sides were wanting the US to take a more active 'bridging' role. Until 2008, Bush had done very little, apart from the 'Road Map' soundbite designed primarily to help sell the Iraq invasion, and by the time of these discussions and negotiations Bush was a lame duck, Sharon was out of the picture and Olmert was a lame duck with Livni looking to take over his party and Netenyahu building strength to return to power.

It's a big shame that since then Obama's government hasn't been filling that role (at least not openly), and it seems increasingly that even if they were, finding willing partners to get that close to a deal will be hard.

It seems to me that Abbas could have taken a deal. It would not have been perfect, but it is certainly better than what he has now. Frankly, if I were the leader of the Palestinians, I would have rushed to take that deal. Wouldn't you have? Time is not on their side.

I don't know that I would have, frankly. As it didn't mean a 1967 line deal, Hamas would have opposed it, which would have led to internal strife even if he could have sold it to Fatah and the rest of the PLO.

They did indeed get close, but as the NYT article does show, the closeness and the give-and-take means that both sides were clearly not able to agree to what the other wanted.

Your position seems to be that because there was 'an' offer, the Palestinians should take it and stop moaning. But if the shoe were on the other foot, and the Israelis are made an offer that's close to it, apparently that's fine to reject because the Israelis are in a 'stronger' negotiating position.

So it's really not about who is right or wrong, is it? Just who is wielding the bigger sticks.

And still, the reality of the situation is that even if he had agreed to it, it would have taken a long time to iron out, there would have had to have been a referendum in the PA (which Hamas and others would use as agitation), as well as some political debate in Israel (where Kadima and Labour were losing ground quickly to the Likud and the religious right). The deal could have fallen through at any stage, and it could have ended up with all kinds of recriminations. So it's all very well with the gift of hindsight to say that what he was offered was better than what he has now, but he didn't know that then, and I think he could see some outcomes of accepting the deal being far worse than what we have now.

Re the Kurds, Dan:

That is not 'the Kurds'. That is 'some of the Kurds'. There are also Kurds (perhaps more) in Turkey, Syria and Iran. You think they will be happy with just a Northern Iraq based state? And do you think Iraq wants to give away any territory to the Kurds? They are ok with autonomy, but independence (and the oilfields in that part of the country)?

I'm no expert on Kurdish history, but that's my point. The Kurds are a stateless people. When the western powers divided up the middle east, they purposefully divided the Kurds amongs many territories, all of which have excluded them from statehood, their culture, and their ethnicity to various degrees. But the Kurds have accepted limited autonomy in Iraq and are working towards a better answer primarily by working with the Iraqi government. I'm just contrasting their behavior to that of the Palestinians.

One of the reasons that the Kurds have been able to get this autonomy was through fighting against Saddam and then being given protection through the no-fly zones. In some ways, the Kurds of Iraq had greater autonomy before 2003 than they have now, with a more unified state and shared leadership (the President of Iraq is a Kurd). During the 1990s - when the Kurdistan Regional Government was just being established - the two main Kurdish political movements, the KUP and the PDK fought a bloody civil war (1994-7).

Besides, when the Western Powers divided up the Ottoman Empire, it was not 'purposeful' that they divided the Kurds up. There was talk of a Kurdish homeland but crucially the Kurds themselves did not agree where it should be, and it overlapped with Armenian claims, and became too much of a headache, so the Kurds became ignored. The main reason for this was that between 1918 (when the Treaty of Sevres was being drawn up, including 'Kurdistan') and 1920 when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the Turks under Ataturk had established greater control over what became the Republic of Turkey through the Turkish War of Independence. In a sense, the assertion of Turkish nationalism ended up crushing Kurdish nationalism. Basically, what happened was that the Turks 'rejected' the offer of a homeland, fought a war and won it, so got a better offer. Atrocious behaviour!

I was ready to take complete responsibility and move forward forcefully,” Olmert told me. “I believed, I still believe, that I would have broken through all the barriers and won over public opinion in this country and the world

He was ready to take complete responsibility but he wouldn't let Abbas walk away with a map?

There's some revisionism, going on...
I've just finished Karen Armstrong's a Short History of Islam, and it really puts into context the extent to which the Islamic world was unsettled by the collapse of the Ottomans and the incursions into the Islamic world of the colonial powers.
Centuries of history, where Islam was a community, were suddenly confronted with newly fabricated nation states.
The creation of Israel within Palestine, as they knew it, was a huge shock. And the newly created governments didn't reflect the nature of governance in the Umaya for hundreds of years...
Its not strange, given the cultural morass Palestinians found themselves in, nor the failure of their ostensible leadership for several decades... that Abbas should react with suspicion to Olmert. Its unfortunate that Olmert couldn't have been more open about his offer ....in order to dispel that suspicion.

About the Kurds. Remember that there remain armed organizations fighting for Kurdish independence in Turkey, Iran and perhaps Syria. (Who knows about Syria anymore). So, although the group in Iraq have "settled", they haven't necessarily foregone wider aspirations.
By settling, they gain access to a great amount of wealth from oil.
The Palestinians and Israelis, on the other hand, appear to have found the only patch of the middle east without oil.

Dan:

Well, when you use your quotes to put a point of view that's questioned - or even contradicted - by the parts you omitted, I don't see what's wrong with pointing that out.

I don’t think it was contradicted by what you pointed out.

Dan:

And when I replied, it was after you'd scolded Ricky and Freeman for their questioning. You clearly are not happy to be 'scolded' back. Ho hum.

Scolded? That’s your interpretation of my written words. Ho hum yourself.
Dan:

No, there's nothing wrong with selective quoting to make your point (of course, when the discovery of the selection undermines that point then it's highly debatable that you were able to 'prove' your point).

Discovery is a funny way to put it. You make it sound like you had to do research to find the quotes. I linked to the entire article. I provided the NYT article. I’ve encouraged everyone to read Al Jazeera’s Palestinian Papers.

Sure, quotes and articles will be selective/biased, etc. But don't get all stroppy when someone points out your bias. We could at least try to be objective?

I honestly think that I am more objective than you are. I just think you refuse to take in information and opinion that contradicts your way of thinking.
Dan:

My 'narrative'? I'm looking at all of the thing you linked to and seeing that it wasn't that simple.

It’s never that simple. No political discussion is that simple. Politics and international relations is always about competing and complicated views by people with different perspectives. Of course it’s not simple. The question is what does the preponderance of the evidence show. What is the essence of the conflict? My view is that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Palestinian leadership will not and cannot make peace. I view that the information on these events during 2006 – 2008 provides more evidence of that along with the negotiations that preceded it.
Dan:

Olmert had zero credibility to be able to offer a deal

He was the democratically elected Prime Minister of a country that follows the rule of law. That’s certainly more credibility than Abbas has now.
Dan:

his idea was to 'ambush' his country by revealing it at the UN and at summits so it became a fait accompli by the time that Israel's politicians got around to debating it and before the upcoming elections.

Ambush is your word. Yes, he wanted to offer his countrymen a package deal to accept or reject. It's not that crazy. Most Israelis support the 2 state solution. Abbas was planning to do the same and Hamas has indicated that they would accept a deal that passes via referendum. That’s not that unusual for representative democracies. Isn’t that how the EU works? Politicians negotiate and make a deal and then there is a national referendum. Certainly this is harder and some degree of secrecy, particularly since a deal may require hundreds of thousands of people to move, is an understandable approach.
Dan:

Why should Abbas take up an offer that risked being completely savaged by the Likud (and others on the Israeli right)? Especially if it's not as good as he wants - it then becomes the new starting point, and he's made concessions before he gets back to negotiations (if any) with Netenyahu or Livni or whoever.

Isn’t the reverse also the case? Why should any Israeli leader take up an offer that risks being completely savaged by other Fatah members (such as the ones that leaked to Al Jazeera) or even Hamas. Especially if it’s not as good as he wants (which it never is in a negotiation) – it then becomes the new starting point and the Israeli PM has made concession before he gets back to negotiations (if any) with Hama or whoever.
Dan:

Seriously, the very 'weakness' of the Palestinian position is part of the reason they would not want to agree to a compromise - it would further weaken their position.

Their position will not get stronger. If they want a state, they have to compromise. That really is my point in a nutshell. I guess you think they are playing it right? Do you measure the offer against your dream or do you measure the offer against the alternative reality?
Dan:

Your position seems to be that because there was 'an' offer, the Palestinians should take it and stop moaning. But if the shoe were on the other foot, and the Israelis are made an offer that's close to it, apparently that's fine to reject because the Israelis are in a 'stronger' negotiating position.

So it's really not about who is right or wrong, is it? Just who is wielding the bigger sticks.

Yes, we are talking about international relations. If it were only about right and wrong, Jews wouldn't have been exiled in the first place. , Thibetans and Kurds would have a state, my land would have a Massapoag majority and Syrians would not be slaughtered by a minority government.
At the same time, if it were only about bigger sticks, then Israel would have taken over much more of the West Bank and deported large numbers of Palestinians by now. Clearly there’s a balance between might and right on the Israeli side.
Dan:

And still, the reality of the situation is that even if he had agreed to it, it would have taken a long time to iron out, there would have had to have been a referendum in the PA (which Hamas and others would use as agitation), as well as some political debate in Israel (where Kadima and Labour were losing ground quickly to the Likud and the religious right). The deal could have fallen through at any stage, and it could have ended up with all kinds of recriminations. So it's all very well with the gift of hindsight to say that what he was offered was better than what he has now, but he didn't know that then, and I think he could see some outcomes of accepting the deal being far worse than what we have now.

Certainly one can always envision bad outcomes. Many Jews thought that accepting the UN partition plan of 1947 would result in their slaughter and another Holocaust. That's precisely what Arab leaders were saying. I think that people and countries make their own luck. That would be my recommendaiton to the Palestinians.
Ricky:

I've just finished Karen Armstrong's a Short History of Islam, and it really puts into context the extent to which the Islamic world was unsettled by the collapse of the Ottomans and the incursions into the Islamic world of the colonial powers.
Centuries of history, where Islam was a community, were suddenly confronted with newly fabricated nation states.
The creation of Israel within Palestine, as they knew it, was a huge shock. And the newly created governments didn't reflect the nature of governance in the Umaya for hundreds of years...
Its not strange, given the cultural morass Palestinians found themselves in, nor the failure of their ostensible leadership for several decades... that Abbas should react with suspicion to Olmert. Its unfortunate that Olmert couldn't have been more open about his offer ....in order to dispel that suspicion.

Certainly the Israelis have the right to be suspicious too, don't you think?
I agree with you that from a Palestinian perspective the creation of Israel in 1948 is the shock. That’s the Nakba. To them, the western powers took their land and gave it to other westerners as compensation for another outstanding claim (the holocaust). Frankly, if I were Palestinian I would probably agree with their narrative. Ultimately, I don’t think the conflict is about the West Bank. It’s about the entire land of Israel/Palestine. The Palestinians cannot accept that another people -- who also have a historical connection (and an unusual one given the 2,000 years that went by) to the same land -- are there, and have no plans to leave.
Frankly, I think Ms. Armstrong’s book supports my narrative. By making a deal with the Israelis, the Palestinians settle for the vast majority of the West Bank and give up their claims to the rest of Israel/Palestine. Abbas said so himself to Rice: “I can’t tell four million Palestinians that only five thousand of them can go home”. Home is not the West Bank. They just cannot do that for perhaps understandable reasons. But that’s what condemns them to be stateless, in my opinion.

The movie "The Gatekeepers" is well worth seeing.

http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/the-pale ... m-1.518724

An interesting op ed in the Israeli press.

The (security) success vis-a-vis the Palestinians and the (peace process) failure made us lose interest in the Palestinians. We got tired of being afraid of them, tired of feeling sorry for them and tired of remembering they were always there.

After the Palestinian national movement was discovered to be dysfunctional (both in war and in peace), Israelis decided it wasn't worth wasting time on it. So the pragmatic Israeli majority turned its back on security and peace process issues and embraced an economic social agenda.
...

Reality will prove to us we cannot deny the demographic challenge, strategic threat and moral problem embodied in the Palestinian issue for long. But when we reopen our eyes and see the huge elephant standing in the center of our life, we will have to find a new way to deal with it.